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Clarke (S)

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ANSWER

TO

Mr. Clark's Third DEFENCE

Of his LETTER to

Mr. DODWELL,

● *Neque decipitur ratio neque decipit unquam.*
Manilius.



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*An ANSWER to
Mr. Clark's Third
Defence, &c.*

WHEN I consider that the Question between Mr. Clark and me, is concerning the force of an *Argument, made use of in his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, to prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul*; and that out of four Objections, insisted on in my *Reflections*, against that Argument, he has dropt the Consideration of *three*; and in Answer to the fourth, is so far from showing, *That if Consciousness did inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts*, (which was the Absurdity, that by his Argument, he labor'd to fix on those who judg'd it possible for Consciousness to in-

here in a System of Matter;) that on the contrary, he has only endeavor'd to prove, against my parallel Instance of Roundness, That it must consist of several Pieces of Roundness, or Tendency towards Roundness; and consequently can only infer, *That if Consciousness did, in like manner with Roundness, inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of several Tendencies towards Consciousness*: I freely acknowledg, that I cannot tell how to justify my self to any Reader (except Mr. Clark himself) in not appealing to him, or in presuming, that he had any need of my Assistance to find out Mr. Clark's apparent Desertion of his Argument. But some Incidental Points to that in hand, of great Importance to be clear'd, having crept into our Dispute; I hope the further continuance of this Debate will not be unacceptable to Lovers of Truth; and that upon that account, they will pardon a Review of the Controversy between us.

There are few Disputes of any Consequence, but the *Rule* by which they ought to be determin'd, is both appeal'd to and call'd in question. When Reason is on our side, we cheerfully submit to its Dictates, and expect that others should do so too; but when we are not able to answer Difficultys alledg'd against our *Schemes*, then we contend that Reason is weak, and from its suppos'd weakness infer, That our Inability to
clear

clear up Difficultys and answer Objections, ought not to hinder our Assent to *them*.

Mr. *Clark* has thought fit to pursue this Method of proceeding with me; and therefore I cannot but esteem it a necessary Preliminary to this Debate, to examine what he says on this Head, and thereby endeavor to fix a Standard or Measure, by which all that we say must be try'd. For to what purpose is disputing and reasoning about the Truth and Falshood of Propositions; when, by any doubt or scruple concerning the Measure whereby we judg of Truth and Falshood, Truth and Falshood either become Names without any Signification at all, or else signify different things in different mens Minds.

• It is demonstrable, according to Mr. *Clark*, That Matter is incapable of Thinking, because it is divisible by *the Power of* 1st Def. *God*. From whence he concludes, that ^{p. 18.} Thinking must reside in an Immaterial Being; in the Idea whereof Extension is contain'd: which is in effect to say, That Thinking can and cannot reside in a divisible Being. For what other Argument can be made use of to prove all Matter divisible, by the Power of God; but what is drawn from the Consideration of its Extension? And if Matter as an extended Being is divisible, all extended Beings must be divisible, and consequently must be incapable of Thinking: unless Mr. *Clark* will say,

That a divisible Being is both capable and incapable of Thinking.

To clear his Argument from this manifest Contradiction, he has recourse to the following Distinction (by which a Man may be enabled to believe every thing, and reason about nothing) That it is absurd to suppose Matter indivisible by the Power of God; but to suppose an extended unsolid Substance indivisible by the Power of God, is only *a difficult Consequence that cannot be perfectly clear'd*: and to make this Distinction intelligible, he urges, *That difficult Consequences, that cannot be perfectly clear'd, do not (like Absurditys and Contradictions) arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas, but barely from the defect and imperfectness of the Ideas themselves.* Which is as much as to say, That Difficulties, which cannot be perfectly clear'd, do not arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas, but from the Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas. For what is a Difficulty which cannot be *clear'd* (or *perfectly clear'd*, for I know no difference) by reason of *defective Ideas*; but a Difficulty which arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of those Ideas? If he means that there is a difference between a Difficulty which arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of perfect or adequate Ideas; and a Difficulty that arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of imperfect or inadequate

2d Def.
P. 38.

3d Def.
P. 81, 82.

inadequate Ideas: I answer, That there is no manner of ground for such a Distinction; or if there was any ground for that *Distinction*, it is not to his purpose, as will evidently appear, if we do but consider what we mean by adequate and inadequate Ideas.

By an Adequate or Perfect Idea, I understand, An Idea which *perfectly represents the* Mr. Lock's Essay of H. U. *Archetype, the Mind supposes it taken from;* as for instance, *all complex Ideas of Modes,* B. 2. c. 31. such as Fear, Courage, &c. Which being *voluntary Collections of simple Ideas, that the Mind puts together, without reference to any real Archetypes existing any where, are adequate Ideas; because they not being intended for Copys of things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, cannot but represent themselves.*

By an Inadequate Idea, I understand, an Idea which does not perfectly represent that Archetype, the Mind supposes it taken from: as for instance, If I put into my Idea of Gold, only its *Colour and Weight*, it is evident they represent not the Archetype my Idea is taken from, but only imperfectly or inadequately. And thus, for ought we know to the contrary, all the Ideas we have that we refer to real Existences, may be Inadequate; for we can never be certain, that we contain in our Idea all the whole plenitude of Essence,

Propertys and Affections, that reside in any Being whatever.

What I have said, if I mistake not, comprehends the intire Sense of the Distinction of adequate and inadequate Ideas. I know Mr. *Locke* accounts simple Ideas adequate; but I cannot see on what ground, but what destroys the Distinction of adequate and inadequate Ideas, and does in reality make all Ideas adequate. For if, as he says, simple Ideas are adequate, *because being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in things ordain'd by God to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those Powers*; Then every Idea whatever may be adequate in that Sense, that is form'd with Care: for we ought not to use a word, to signify any Idea whatever, but so far as the Idea goes, it ought to correspond to the Archetype it is refer'd to. As for instance, If I should put into my Idea of Man, *solid Substance, Life, Sense, Spontaneous Motion, and a Faculty of reasoning*; it is plain, all this agrees to Man, how inadequate soever a Representation it is of him, and is as much correspondent and adequate to the Subject it is taken from, as any simple Idea is to the Power that occasions it. For simple Ideas, by means of Organs of different Perfection, cannot be precisely alike in different Men; and consequently must in many Men, if not in all, be imperfect and inadequate, if consider'd with
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relation to the whole Power that occasions them, tho they are adequate and correspondent to a Power in nature, so far as they go and were design'd to be. Now if all Ideas, as refer'd to things existing, are really imperfect and inadequate; and if with relation to things existing, there is no other Test of Truth, but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; then if Mr. *Clark* denies not all Knowledg, that relates to things existing, he cannot distinguish between Difficultys that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas, and Difficultys that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas. And if he allows that Difficultys which arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas are *Absurditys* and *Contradictions*, he gives up his Distinction. So that he must either destroy all Knowledg or Science relating to things existing, or else own that there is no difference between *Difficultys* that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas, and *Difficultys* that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas.

2. But to vindicate Human Knowledg, and show further the groundlessness of Mr. *Clark's* Distinction; I observe, That tho we can never be sure, that we have adequate Ideas of any thing that exists, yet we have as much reason to think, that our
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inadequate Ideas agree to the reality of things, as adequate Ideas do to the Archetypes they are refer'd to; and consequently have no reason but to conclude, that inadequate Ideas can be as well compar'd together, and as right Judgments form'd from their Comparison, as from the Comparison of adequate Ideas. For suppose, I see something in a Mist, near the Size and Shape of an ordinary Man; which tho I see not distinctly enough to know, whether it be a Statue or a Man; yet I may certainly know it not to be a *Steeple*, by perceiving the Disagreement between the Idea of a *Steeple*, and the Figure I see, as I can know a moral or abstract Mathematical Proposition to be false, by perceiving the Disagreement of the Ideas of which it is made up. Wherefore since we can as well know or be certain, by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of inadequate Ideas as of adequate Ideas; the Difficultys that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of both adequate and inadequate Ideas, must be equally Contradictions, and consequently there is no ground for Mr. *Clark's* Distinction.

3. Was not a Difficulty that arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas, as much an Absurdity as a Difficulty that arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas; we could not discourse at all with Certainty of the

the principal Objects of Religion, *God and his Attributes*. The Ideas we fix to the Terms, *God and his Attributes*, are no doubt inadequate Ideas, if any of our Ideas are inadequate: and yet in Religious Discourses we argue from the Justice, Veracity, Goodness, Holiness and Wisdom of God; and say that such and such things must be, because they follow from the Supposition of those Attributes; and that such and such things cannot be, because they are inconsistent with them, that is, such and such things agree or disagree to our Ideas of the Justice, Veracity, Holiness, Goodness and Wisdom of God. As for instance, we say, It is inconsistent with his Justice, to punish eternally a Man who obeys his Laws, and to reward a Man who disobeys them; and on the other side, that it is agreeable to his Justice, to reward a Man that obeys his Laws, and to punish a Man that disobeys them. Mr. Clark himself argues, That moral and immoral Actions *must be attended with Rewards and Punishments: because the same Reasons that prove God himself to be necessarily just and good; and the Rules of Justice, Equity and Goodness, to be his unalterable Will, Law, and Command to all created Beings; prove also, that he cannot but be pleas'd with and approve such Creatures as imitate and obey him, by observing those Rules, and be displeas'd with such as act contrary thereto; and consequently cannot*

Lectures,
vol. II.
p. 155.

cannot but someway or other make a sutable difference in his Dealings with them. But
 Ib. p. 161. since the Condition of Men in this present State is such, that the natural Order of things in this World is in event manifestly perverted, and Vertue and Goodness are visibly prevented in great measure, from obtaining their proper and due Effects, in establishing Mens Happiness proportionable to their Behaviour and Practice—Therefore, It is certain that there must be a future State of Existence for Men, as that by an exact Distribution of Rewards and Punishments therein, all the present Disorders and Inequalitys will be set right, and the whole Scheme of Providence which, to us who judg of it by only one small Portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and confus'd.

Now on what is this Argument founded, but on Mr. Clark's inadequate Idea of the Justice of God? And wherein does its Strength lye (if it has any) but in his Perception of the Disagreement of the visible Disorders and Inequalitys in this World, with his inadequate Idea of the Justice of God, without the necessary Supposition of a future State, to set right those Disorders and Inequalitys? Wherefore since Mr. Clark thinks he argues with certainty for a future State, and since he argues only from a defective or inadequate Idea; and since there can be no arguing in the Case, but from the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas

Ideas as we have; it follows, That Mr. *Clark* must allow that Certainty can be attain'd where our Ideas are inadequate or imperfect, as where they are adequate or perfect: that is, the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas as we have, whether perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate, is the true and only Criterion of Truth; unless Mr. *Clark* will deny the force of his own Argument for a future State, or say, that we have an adequate Idea of the Attributes of God.

4. But supposing there was a just ground to distinguish between our Knowledg that relates to things existing, and our Knowledg that relates to Ideas of the Mind which have no Archetypes beyond their own Existence, so that in one Case there is not the same Degree of Certainty, as in the other; yet Mr. *Clark* has no reason here to oppose them to one another, because his Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul is and can be only founded on the sole Comparison of the inadequate Ideas of Matter, Spirit, and Thinking. And therefore an Objection or Difficulty founded on the Disagreement of those imperfect or inadequate Ideas, is as much a Demonstration of the Falshood of a Proposition that involves such a Difficulty, as the Agreement of inadequate Ideas, is a Demonstration of the Truth of a Proposition made up of such Ideas. And consequently, whether there is or is not any just ground

ground for Mr. Clark's Distinction, it serves not his purpose in the least.

5. But perhaps the Reader may, from the Writings of the Papists for Transubstantiation, and from the Writings of some Protestants against the *Socinian Heresy*, ask, Whether there are not in some Questions Demonstrations on both sides, and consequently that the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is not the *Criterion* or *Test* of Truth. In answer to which, I freely declare it to be my Opinion, That whatever can be demonstrated, can be *perfectly clear'd* from all Objections and Difficultys; and that any Person that understands a Demonstration and the Objections made against it, is capable of solving them; and that all the *Difficultys* that may be urg'd against the *Immensity and Eternity of God, &c.* which Mr. Clark says, *cannot be clearly answer'd*, are to be clearly answer'd. And in order to answer them clearly, I would only require these equitable Conditions of him, that he would define the Terms *Immensity, Eternity, Immaterial Being, &c.* and show that his Definitions agree to the things existing, that they refer to.

2d Def.
p. 38, 39.

3d Def.
p. 82.

He proceeds: *Our Reason*, says he, *is able to apprehend clearly the Demonstration of the Certainty of some things, where the Imagination is not able to comprehend the Ideas of the things themselves.* That is, if I understand him

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him right, we can apprehend clearly, suppose, that an Immaterial Being exists, or that something exists correspondent to the Idea we fix to the Terms *Immaterial Being*, without being able to comprehend intirely all that exists in the Being our Idea refers to. And what then? How does it follow from hence that there is any difference between Difficulties that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas, and Difficultys that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas? Cannot I, tho I know but in part the Archetype to which my Idea of Immaterial Being refers, have a just Idea of Immaterial Being as far as my Idea goes? And if it be so, why should I not be able to answer all Objections against the Existence of that which I clearly apprehend does exist? Nay, What other Method can there be taken in the use of such Words, as *Immaterial Being*, *Infinity*, *Immensity*, &c. but to make them stand for intelligible and consistent Ideas, which have a Conformity to things that really exist? And why intelligible and consistent Ideas should not be capable of being clear'd from all Difficulty, I shall then be able to conceive, when I can see no difference between *intelligible* and *unintelligible*, *consistent* and *inconsistent*.

By what has been said, the intelligent Reader may be satisfy'd, that, when I understood *Difficultys that cannot be perfectly clear'd,*

3d Def.
P. 82.

clear'd, to signify Contradictions and Absurdities, I did not depart from that Fairness for which, Mr. Clark says, my former Papers were justly commended. And I am not without some hopes, that Mr. Clark may contradict himself once more in my favour, since in this Third Defence he is pleas'd to contradict what he said in his Second Defence, for he there accus'd me of Unfairness, and now acquits me of it.

2d Def.
P. 32.

Refl. p. 40,
Cyc.

I proceed now to the Question concerning the Possibility of Matter's being conscious: and as I have show'd that finite Extension in an Immaterial Being implys Divisibility as well as in a material Being, and consequently, according to Mr. Clark, must be a Subject equally incapable of thinking with material Being; so I shall endeavour to reconcile Mr. Clark to himself, by showing, that his Argument drawn from the Divisibility (or which is all one the Extension) of Matter, is inconclusive. His Argument is as follows: *That all the Qualitys or Powers which either are in Matter, whether they be known or unknown, or are vulgarly ascrib'd to it, must of Necessity be either,*

3d Def.
P. 4.

1. *Real Qualitys truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascrib'd; such as Magnitude and Motion in Matter. These, says he, are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same kind, inhering distinctly*

distinctly in the several parts of the material Subject. And could Consciousness in like ^{1st Def.} *manner be a Quality really inherent in a System* ^{P. 9.} *of Matter; it must likewise be the Sum and Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts: and so there would be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there are Particles of Matter of which the System consists.*

Or, 2. Qualitys not really inhering in the ^{3d Def.} *Subject to which they are usually ascrib'd, but* ^{P. 4.} *being indeed Modes excited and residing in some other Subject: such as are Colours, Sounds, and all those which are commonly sensible Qualitys of Matter. These do not exist at all in that Subject to which they are usually ascrib'd, but in some other Subject. And this also not being applicable to thinking, 'tis manifest therefore, that thinking cannot be a Power or Quality of this kind in a material Subject.*

Or, 3. Such Qualitys as Magnetism, Electricity, Attraction, Reflexibility, Refrangibility, and the like. These have no real Existence by way of proper inhering in any Subject; which likewise since it cannot be said of Consciousness, 'tis manifest, that Consciousness cannot be a Power or Quality in a material System of this kind neither.

In answer to which Argument, the Substance of one Objection that I urg'd was, that his Enumeration was imperfect, because he omitted the Consideration of the Modes of those kinds of Powers mention'd in the first Branch of his Division; and

that Consciousness being according to me a Mode of one of those kinds of Powers, it is impossible his Argument should conclude against Consciousnesses inhering in a System of Matter, when that Quality that agrees with Consciousness is not nam'd in his Enumeration. As for instance, Consciousness being with me a Power or Quality in Matter answering to a Mode of Motion ~~and~~ Figure, such as the peculiar Motion of a Clock, or Roundness, the Consideration of Consciousness, as such a Quality or Power, shows, that his Argument is perfectly foreign to the Question. For if Consciousness be consider'd like Roundness or any other Mode of Figure, or like a Mode of Motion in an Animal or Clock, it is manifest, 1st, that it has a real and proper Inherence, and is not an Effect residing in no Substance at all, and consequently answers not *Magnetism, Electricity, &c.* 2^{dly}. That it has a real Inherence in the Subject of which it is said to be a Quality, and consequently answers not to Colour and Sound, which exist not in the Substance to which they are ascrib'd. And 3^{dly}. That as it inheres truly and properly in Matter, so it is not of the same Extent, nor does it answer to Figure, Magnitude, and Motion. For Roundness inheres in a System of Matter, without being the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts. And the like may be said of the peculiar and individual Modes of Motion

tion in a Clock, or an Animal, that they inhere not distinctly in each of the distinct parts. I did not take upon me to determine of what kind of Power Thinking or Consciousness was a Mode; but for greater Clearness in arguing, I did take the Liberty to speak of it as a Mode of Motion. Now if it be consider'd as a Mode of Motion, that is, if it consists of ten thousand distinct Motions, it is as impossible that whole Consciousness should exist in each of the distinct parts of a System of Matter, as that whole Roundness should exist in each part of a Circle, or that the individual Motion of an Animal or Clock should exist in each of their distinct parts. Wherefore it is evident, that the Strength of his Argument^s lies in considering Consciousness as standing for an Idea inconsistent with its being a Power of Matter, that follows *from the Division or Composition* of Matter, as he propos'd to consider it in his *Letter to Mr. P. 33. Dodwell*: and therefore his Demonstration was granted by me, as not affecting the Question he propos'd to prove, since it related solely to a Chimera * or Idea, that he was pleas'd to suppose, without any

* If the Reader could doubt of my meaning in p. 60. of my Reflections, he may consider what I say here as the Explanation of it; and then he will see, that what Mr. Clark advances in p. 50. and some following Pages, needs no particular Answer.

ground, I was oblig'd to rank Consciousness under.

ef. Mr. Clark, to show that his Argument is conclusive against the Possibility of Matter's thinking, lays down this Proposition as what he proposes to *explain and vindicate*; That *it is absolutely impossible, and an evident Contradiction, that any real Quality should truly and properly inhere in a System of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers and Qualitys residing distinctly in the several parts of the System, and being always of the same kind with the whole that results from them.*

In answer to this I humbly conceive, that Mr. Clark ought to have laid down a Conclusion clearly contradictory to me, and not have express'd himself in such a manner, that I can agree to what he says, consistently with maintaining the Force of my Objection. As for instance, I do allow, that no Quality can reside in a System of Matter, but what *must be always in a certain sense of the same kind with the whole that results from the parts.* For when Roundness or any other individual Figure inheres in a System of Matter, the parts must be so far *of the same kind*, as to have a Tendency to that individual Figure of which they are a part. And in that sense I have always allow'd Consciousness to consist of *Powers of the same kind*; for if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, it must necessarily be

be allow'd, that the distinct Beings in that System contribute towards thinking, as the pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the parts of a System of matter contribute towards the System: unless a Man will say, that Consciousness inheres in a divisible Substance, and does not inhere in it at the same time. Wherefore his Proposition to be vindicated is obscure; and I desire the Reader to observe, that no Proposition can be truly contradictory to what I affirm, unless it affirms that every Quality that inheres in a System of Matter, must inhere wholly in each part of it; that is, that in a round Figure every Particle must be round: for unless he affirms and proves *that* which is so manifestly against Experience, he will never contradict me, or be able to show, that Consciousness must necessarily (if it inheres in a System of Matter) consist of several distinct Consciousnesses.

To vindicate his Conclusion, Mr. Clark ^{3d De} premises a Discourse of the various use of ^{p. 11.} the Terms *Powers of the same kind*; to which, that I may not disoblige him by taking no notice of it, I answer, that when Terms are defin'd, and Instances agreeing to those Definitions given, whereby all Doubtfulness about one another's meaning is in the most effectual manner excluded, I cannot see of what use it is to enumerate the various Senses that *Logicians* give to the same Terms, especially since I have the Authority of the Schools (as Mr. Clark re-
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3d Def.
P. 13.

presents them) for my use of those Terms: tho had I understood them in a sense not to be justify'd from their Authority, my mistake had only been in the meaning of two or three *English* Words, which was a matter of no great consequence when the Words were defin'd. Wherefore I proceed to the Defence of his Argument.

P. 14.

He says, *When he affirms, that Roundness or Globosity must needs be the Sum of Qualities of the same kind; he does not mean that Globosity is made up of Globosities, but that a whole round Figure must necessarily be made up of pieces of Roundness, which are all of the same kind with Roundness. For nothing that is void of Figure can be part of any Figure whatsoever; nor any thing that is void of Curvity in particular, be part of a round Circumference; nor any thing that is void of that particular degree of Curvity which makes a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be part of the Circumference of that Circle. And to prove that Roundness consists of pieces of Roundness or Powers of the same kind, in that sense with Roundness, he spends near twenty Pages. All which, for ought I know, may be a Vindication of the Conclusion he laid down, and that I cited, but concerns not his Argument in the least. For what Mr. Clark endeavor'd to prove against those who judg'd it possible for Matter to think, was, that no Power could inhere in a System of Matter without being the Sum of Powers of the same kind; and consequently that*

that if Thinking or Consciousness did inhere in a System of Matter, there must be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there are parts in that System. And to show how inconclusive that was, I produc'd Roundness (and I might have produc'd almost all the Modes of Motion and Figure that can exist) as an Instance that a Power might inhere in a System of Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the same kind: that is, that Roundness might inhere in a System of Matter, without making as many distinct Roundnesses as there are parts in that System; and consequently, that Consciousness, if it inher'd in a System of Matter in like manner with Roundness, cou'd not consist of the Consciousnesses of the parts. Now how does it follow, *That if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, it must consist of the Consciousnesses of the parts, or in that sense of Powers of the same kind*; because in another sense, Roundness, which I made parallel to Consciousness, consists of *Powers of the same kind*, viz. of *Figures and Curvities*? for it is readily allow'd by me that Roundness consists of pieces of Roundness, which by being all Figures are of the same kind with Roundness, consider'd as a Figure; and by being little Curves or Arches, are likewise of the same kind with Roundness, consider'd as a Curve: And in that sense I allow Consciousness to consist of Powers of the same

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kind;

kind ; for that, according to me, consists of Parts which have a tendency to Thinking or Consciousness, as Roundness does of Parts that have a tendency to Roundness. And yet for all that, neither Roundness nor Consciousness consist of *Powers of the same kind* in the sense of Mr. Clark's Argument: For unless in a round Figure, each part must be wholly round ; and in a conscious System of Matter, each part must be wholly conscious, and in that sense consist of *Powers of the same kind* ; not one Step can be taken in Defence of Mr. Clark's Argument: Nay, what he has advanc'd is so far from defending it, that it evidently demonstrates the Falshood of it. For if Roundness does consist of Parts, none of which can possibly be round (as Mr. Clark evidently shows it must, by proving that Roundness must consist only of pieces of Roundness) and that are only Powers of the same kind with Roundness, by being all Figures, and by consisting of Parts that have a nearer affinity to Roundness than strait Lines ; it is a Demonstration that there may be Powers in Matter, which are not the Sums of Powers of the same kind, in that sense which shows the Inconclusiveness of his Argument. For when it is prov'd, that Roundness consists of Parts, none of which can possibly be round, there is a full and perfect Instance to show, that Consciousness may inhere in a System of Matter, with-

without each of the Parts being distinctly conscious. So that as far as I can see, the force of Mr. *Clark's Defence* lyes in understanding the Terms, *Powers of the same kind*, in a different sense from what he did at first, and in a sense that evidently shows his Argument has no force. However, he is capable of making the same Conclusion in words, that he did at first, *viz. That no Power can inhere in a System of Matter, without being the sum of Powers of the same kind*; and that, I will allow him, is artful enough to impose on Readers that are willing to be satisfy'd, on his side of the Question.

But let us see, how he applys all that he says, for twenty Pages together, to prove *Roundness must consist of Powers of the same kind* (in the sense he now contends for, and that I allow to be true) to the Question, *That if Consciousness does inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of the distinct Consciousnesses of the Parts.*

I can find nothing to that Question, but in these words; *That the individual Round-^{3d Def.}ness of a Globe is not made up of a number^{p. 23.} of the like whole Roundnesses, (and I add, nor is it made up of any number of Roundnesses or any round Parts at all) but yet must needs be made up of such Figures as are Parts of Roundness, nay Parts indu'd with that particular numerical degree of Roundness; and cannot be made up of strait Lines, nor of any Figures*

Figures which are not Pieces endu'd with that particular degree of Roundness. So that an individual Consciousness (supposing it to inhere in a System of Matter) must be made up, tho not of the very same Consciousnesses, yet of such Powers as are of the very same kind with that numerical Consciousness, as the Arches of a Circle are of the same kind with the whole Circumference—That is, It must be made up of different Consciousnesses indeed, but still Consciousnesses only. All which, I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, That tho Roundness consists of Parts or Pieces of Roundness (none of which can possibly be round) yet, if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, in like manner with Roundness (that is, consists of Parts, none of which can possibly be conscious) there must be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there are Parts; which is in effect to say, If Consciousness inheres in like manner in a System of Matter with Roundness, it inheres in a different manner from Roundness: Or in other words; if Consciousness by inhering in a System of Matter does not consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts, it does consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.

This is the stress of his Demonstration, which I think I may submit to the intelligent Reader, without any Reply, 1st. Because it visibly confutes it self; and 2^{dly}. Because on this Occasion, I have a mind to show

how my Complaisance to Mr. *Clark*, in letting him have the Satisfaction to see his *Demonstration* stand in its full force, without any attack from me: for when I consider, that it can deceive no Reader but himself, and that by a Citation from Mr. *Hobbes* in his Title Page, he is of Opinion, *that Arguments seldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engag'd themselves in a contrary Opinion*; I think it would be a piece of ill Nature to disturb his particular Satisfaction, in the force of his Argument.

But there is one thing more, of which I think it necessary to inform the Reader, with relation to my Instance of *Roundness*, and that is, That I made use of it to no other Purpose, than to give the Reader an Idea, how Consciousness might inhere in a System of Matter, without consisting of the Consciousnesses of the Parts; and that purpose I think it fully answers. But whether in other respects Consciousness answers to Roundness, concerns not me: May, I profess that I think, it differs from Roundness, and all other Modes of Figure, in many respects; and therefore I am not answerable for any Disagreement between Roundness and Consciousness, provided they agree in consisting of Parts, none of which are distinctly round or distinctly conscious.

I did urge several other Instances of *Modes* to my purpose (for indeed almost every *Mode* in Matter is to my purpose) but I chuse rather to remit their Defence to the Consideration of the Reader, who may, from the Principles already advanc'd, easily solve Mr. *Clark's* Objections, than spend more words to show the Inconclusiveness of his Argument, when I think enough has been said already.

Wherefore I proceed to the Consideration of the remaining Parts of Mr. *Clark's* *Defence*.

That I might let the Reader more clearly into the force of my Objection to Mr. *Clark's* Argument, and make my self more intelligible, *I did suppose Consciousness (of whose Nature I was ignorant) to be a Mode of Motion, and not a Mode of some unknown Power; and the rather because, I thought, I had to do with a Gentleman, that understood the Rules of arguing too well, to impute that to me as my Opinion, which I only took the Liberty to suppose. But Mr. Clark not taking to himself my Character of an ingenuous Adversary, will make me accountable for the Absurdity of the Notion of Thinking's being really a Mode of Motion; tho he might as well have made me accountable for the Absurdity of the Notion of Thinking's being really a Mode of Figure, because I likened Thinking to Roundness, as much as I did to a Mode of Motion: but without any*

Ref. p. 19.

3d Def.
p. 38.

any design by either, to assert it as my Opinion, that Thinking was either a Mode of Motion, or a Mode of Figure; having no Design then to inquire into the Nature of Thinking. Wherefore I'm concern'd to vindicate my *Supposition*, no farther than the Nature of my Objection requir'd, which was only to assign such an Instance of a Power in Matter, that did not consist of Powers of the same kind, in such a Sense as destroy'd the force of Mr. *Clark's* Argument. And therefore should the Absurdity of the Notion of Thinking's being *really* a Mode of Motion be prov'd; yet the Absurdity of my *Supposition* would not in the least be prov'd. I use the Supposition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion to no other end, but to express my meaning intelligibly, how Thinking may inhere in a System of Matter, without being the sum of the distinct Thinkings of the Parts; and if my Supposition serves that purpose, it is nothing to me, let the Absurdity of supposing Thinking to be really a Mode of Motion, be as great as he pleases. Therefore when Mr. *Clark* proposes to prove against me, by the *Arguments* contain'd between p. 38, and p. 54. *the Absurdity of supposing* p. 39. *Consciousness to be a Mode of Motion* (meaning the Supposition that *Consciousness* is really a Mode of Motion) he changes the Question in dispute, under an appearance in words of confuting my *Supposition*; where-

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as my *Supposition* is no more touch'd on, in those Arguments, than the most foreign Question in the World. However, that Mr. *Clark* may be kept a little more in Countenance for his Labours here, than for the Pains he has taken about *Roundness*, I will so far transgress the Rules of Dispute, as to consider, whether he proves a Proposition that was not in debate between us: and I hope the Reader will be pleas'd to excuse me, for the Breach of the Rules of Disputation, for the sake of my Complaisance to Mr. *Clark*. The Method I shall take, shall be briefly to enquire into the Nature of Thinking, and then into the force of Mr. *Clark's* Arguments, to prove Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion.

1. As to the Nature of Thinking, I observe, that Thinking is an Action that begins not in us, till we are operated on by external material Objects, that act on us by Motion and Contact; no more than a Windmill begins to go till the Air or some other Body strikes against the Sails. For we having no Objects or Ideas to think upon, but what are ultimately founded on and resolv'd into the simple Ideas of *Sensation* and *Reflection* (by the first of which we have all our Ideas of sensible Qualities in Bodys external to us, and by the latter all our Ideas of Thinking, and its Modes, *viz.* doubting, willing, knowing, &c.) cannot think first on the Ideas of Reflection, be-

because we must think upon something before we can reflect or think upon Thinking and its Modes; and since that *something* cannot be Thinking or any of its Modes, it remains that we must first think on the simple Ideas of Sensation. And if we first think on the simple Ideas of Sensation, it is matter of fact, that we do not begin to think upon them till Bodys operate upon us. And this is an evident Agreement of Human Thinking with a Power or Affection of Matter, which ever owes its Existence to the Motion or Operation of some other Body. What is *Fire* but a Power or Affection of Matter, beginning in Matter perfectly free from that peculiar Mode of Motion, till by the Application of Matter in Motion it is produc'd? And what are other Powers or Affections of Matter, such as bitter, sweet, sour, soft, hard, cold, all Smells, Tasts, Sounds, &c. but peculiar Modes of Motion or Figure, that begin in particular Systems of Matter, upon the Action of other Matter upon them?

Did we perceive Ideas antecedent to the Operation of Matter on our Senses, there might be some Colour to suppose Human Thinking not a Power or Affection of Matter (since Matter cannot be conceiv'd from no Action, or Rest, to begin an Action) but Thinking following the Motion of Matter on our Senses, we have just as much reason to conclude, that it is a Power or Affection
of

of Matter occasion'd by the Action of Matter, as we have to say, that Fire is a Power or Affection of Matter, when it is produc'd by the rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-Tree. And I see not why it is not as necessary to introduce the Hypothesis of an Immaterial Being into every material Subject, to account for its wonderful Operations, as for the Operations of Man or Beast. I doubt not, but that it is very possible to be part of the Religion of the most learned Country in *Europe* (if we can form any Judgment what they may believe from what they do believe) to believe, that Repetitions of Words in *Eccho's* are perform'd by an intelligent or immaterial Being that mocks us, according to *Ovid's* Description of her, as a real Being :

— *Quæ nec reticere loquenti,*
Nec prior ipsa loqui didicit, resonabilis Eccho.
Corpus adhuc Eccho, non vox erat: & tamen
usum
Garrula non aliam, quam nunc habet, oris ha-
bebat;
Reddere de multis ut verba novissima posset.
— *in fine loquendi*
Ingeminat voces; auditaq; verba reportat.

And then we should see as many learned Treatises, to show the Inconsistency of such a regular Repetition of articulate Sounds in any Being but an immaterial Being (which

(which is suppos'd only to have Memory and Reflection) as *Tertullian's*, and some other antient Fathers are to prove the Soul material; and as any of the Moderns are to prove the Soul immaterial.

2. Human Thinking has Succession and Parts, as all material Actions have; for all our Thoughts succeed one another, can be suspended in a Point, or continu'd in like manner with a Mode of Motion, and so are as much distinguishable into Parts.

3. Thinking has its Modes, such as Doubting, Willing, Knowing, Pleasure, Pain, &c. just as particular Powers of Matter have their Modes. Sound (which in the Body to which it is attributed, is nothing but a Mode of Motion) has Modes of acute, grave, &c. which with their several Degrees, are capable of being vary'd *in infinitum*. And as Sounds are swift or slow, regular or irregular, according to the different Action of Matter; so the Soul thinks swiftly or slowly, regularly or irregularly, is drunk or sober, has Pleasure or Pain, according to the different Motions produc'd in our Bodys.

4. It is evident to me that God must be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without any of the Propertys of Matter, without Solidity, Extension or Motion, and that exists in no place; and not a Being that

has Extension (and consequently exists in Place and has Parts) according to Mr. *Clark's* Idea of Immaterial Being. Now Thinking in God cannot be founded on any Objects acting upon him, nor can Thinking in him be successive or consist of Parts; nor can his Thinking have any Modes, because Modes of Thinking are distinct Acts of Thinking. But as his Essence is eternal and immutable, without any the least Variation or Alteration, so his Thinking is one numerical individual Act, comprehending all things and all the Possibilities of things at one View; and is as fixt, and permanent and unvariable, and as much without Succession and Parts, as his Essence. So that if we can form any Judgment of the nature of Thinking in Man, from its perfect Conformity with the Powers of Matter, and its intire and total Disagreement with Thinking, in that only Immaterial Being which, we are satisfy'd, exists; we may reasonably conclude Human Thinking a Power or Affection of Matter.

If it be ask'd, Of what kind of Power in Matter, Thinking is a Mode? Is it a Mode of Motion, or a Mode of some unknown Power? To that I answer, That I pretend not to know that Secret, and therefore will only make these two Observations.

i. That

1. That Mr. *Clark* allows Matter, or the Bodily Organs, to act upon the Soul. Now ^{3d Def.} Matter cannot act upon an Immaterial Being by Motion, because there can be no Contact between a material and immaterial Being: Wherefore by Mr. *Clark's* own Principles, there must be a Power in Matter unknown to us, and of which we have no Idea; and if there is a Power in Matter, of which we have no Idea, that Power in Matter may comprehend under it Thinking and its Modes, as Figure does Roundness, &c. and Motion the several Modes of Motion, and their Modes.

2. It is by many thought a Difficulty to conceive, how by a mere Preference of the Mind, we can cause our left Hand, which was in motion, to be at rest; and our right Hand, which was at rest, to be in motion; and by a new Will, Choice or Preference (call it as you please) to put the left Hand in motion, and the right Hand at rest, and so on, let our Wills vary and change ever so often. But that Difficulty is intirely at an end; if Thinking in Man be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in motion: and it is then as conceivable, that Thinking should produce those Motions, as that a Spring or Weight in a Clock should make a Clock strike or point to the Hour of the Day.

But let us proceed to Mr. *Clark's* Arguments, to prove, that *Thinking cannot*

be a Mode of Motion in Matter.

3d Def.
r. 40.

His first Argument is, *That Modes of Motion are nothing else but particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea, beyond the Genus of Motion.*—And he has as clear and distinct a Perception, that the Idea of Consciousness contains something in it, besides and beyond the Genus of Motion; as he has, that it contains in it something beyond the Genus of Figure.—He has therefore exactly the same intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion; as he has that any one thing in the World is not another, whose Idea is the remotest and most different from it that can be imagin'd.

To which I answer, That tho we have an abstract Idea of Motion, which as it ought, so I doubt not but it does comprehend under it all the Modes of Motion, that ever did or can exist; yet I deny, that we have an Idea of all the really existing, much less of all the possibly existing Modes of Motion. We have Ideas of the more simple Modes of Motion; such as a circular Motion, or Motion in a strait line. But when the Motions are very complex, such as the Mode of Motion in a Tree, by which Vegetation is perform'd; and the Mode of Motion in a Man or Animal, by which Life and Sensation is continu'd: we have not a distinct Conception of them in our Minds. The only distinct Conception that we have of such Modes is, that they have

have in them the genus of Motion; and that they have Succession and Parts, and can be variously modify'd. Now as far as we know any thing of the nature of Thinking, by what we find and feel in our selves; *That* has likewise the genus of Motion, by arising from Motion, by being vary'd by Motion, and by its producing other Motions distinct from it self; and has likewise Succession and Parts, and withal innumerable Modifications. Wherefore since no particular Idea of Human Consciousness can be produc'd, beyond the genus of Motion; and that we have no particular Ideas of the more complex Modes of Motion that exist: It is impossible for him to prove or know, that one is not the other. For till he has a further Idea of the nature of Human Thinking, than what I have describ'd; and a particular distinct Idea of that complex Mode of Motion, that exists in our Animal Spirits; he can no more know, that one is not the other, than he can know, whether two things agree or differ from one another, that he has no Idea of at all. Indeed a Man may say, That a Wheel in Motion does not think, or that a circular Motion is not Thinking; because we see not any of the Effects of Thinking follow from a circular Motion; tho I doubt not, but (if the Effects of Thinking follow'd from a circular Motion, as much as they do whenever that complex

Motion peculiar to the Body of a Man, exists) that Mr. Clark would have recourse to the *Hypothesis of Immaterial Being*, and say, That Immaterial Beings were added to all Wheels, on the Production of every circular Motion. But it is not possible for us, to say, that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking, as something distinct from a Mode of Motion, or as distinct from a Power or Affection of Matter; of none of which has Mr. Clark given us any Ideas.

2. I have bin the longer on this Argument than was necessary, because what I have offer'd, will in a great measure serve to set this Question in a true light; otherwise there needed nothing to be said to an Argument which does only affirm the Question in debate, and which can signify nothing to any body that wants Conviction: for as he only affirms, *That he has an intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion*; so a Man may affirm against him, that by a Survey of the nature of Human Thinking, and the different Effects of Motion, he knows or perceives that Human Thinking is a Mode of Motion; and another may affirm with me, that he is so far ignorant of the nature of Human Thinking, as not to know, whether it be a Mode of Motion or no. All
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three prove alike, and have nothing else to do, but to submit their several Affirmations to the Reader, but can never convince one another. Mr. *Clark* has indeed affirm'd the Question that he has brought into dispute, in stronger Words than I have produc'd from him, as *That it is a greater* ^{3d Def.} *Absurdity*, and *more ridiculous* than some ^{P. 41.} evidently false and ridiculous Propositions, which he is pleas'd to produce as Parallels to what he would make me affirm. But I humbly conceive, there is no more proof in such Assertions, than in the most modest and civil Affirmations. However, I thought my self oblig'd to do him the Justice, to produce what he says, that it may have its Weight with the Reader; because I ought to suppose he intended it for Argument.

His second Argument to prove, that *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is, ^{3d Def.} *If Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion*, ^{P. 42.} *it would follow, that all Motion would be a degree of Thinking.* To which, as well as to all that follows under this Head, I think it sufficient to reply: That Matter is every where the same, and all alike; but becomes Fire, or Water, or produces Smells, Tasts and Sounds, &c. according as it is diversify'd by Motion: and as it is suppos'd, that Motion can produce nothing but Motion, so these Differences in Matter are nothing but peculiar Modes of Motion. Wherefore

if it be proper to say, That every Motion is a Degree of Fire, a Degree of Water, a Degree of all the Modes of Smell, a Degree of all the Modes of Sound, a Degree of Bitter, and a Degree of Sweet, a Degree of Vegetation, and a Degree of Corruption; I do in that sense allow, that every Motion is a Degree of Thought; if it be true, that Thinking is a Mode of Motion, as Mr. Clark supposes it to be in this Argument.

3d Def.
P. 43.

His third *Argument* to prove, *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is, *That if Thinking was a Mode of Motion; then Motion would be a more generical Power than Thinking. Whereas, On the contrary, says he, 'tis evident, that Thinking is a Power, infinitely more generical, than either Figure or Motion, or any other Power of Matter. There are as many Ideas of Figure, as there are Figures; and there are as many Ideas of Motion, as there are Modes of Motion; and as many Ideas of other things, as there are other things in the World, that can be thought upon: And all these Ideas are Modes, and Sorts or Kinds of Thinking.*

1. When Motion is said to be more *generic* than any particular Species or Mode of Motion; and when Figure is said to be more generical, than any particular Mode of Figure: I take the meaning of it to be, that Figure and Motion are abstract Ideas, which comprehend under them all the particular

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particular Modes of Figure and Motion, that can possibly exist; so that wherever any particular Figure or Motion exists, it has a Conformity to our abstract Ideas of Figure and Motion: Whereas a circular Motion and Squareness are abstract Ideas, to which only a particular Mode of Motion and Figure has a Conformity. So that Motion and Figure are call'd more generical than any particular Motion or Figure, because their Ideas are contain'd under them.

But when Mr. Clark calls *Thinking* in Man a more generical Power than Motion and Figure, I am perfectly at a loss what he means. Does he mean, that Thinking is a Power, which does consist both of Motions and Figures? If he does mean so, (and I know not what other sense, according to the meaning of the Terms *more generical* in this place, to understand him in) then if it be proper Language to call that an Individual Power, which consists of all possible Motions, and all possible Figures; What does Mr. Clark do, in affirming, Thinking to be *more generical than Motion*, but make Thinking a perfectly material Action? for unless it comprehends under it all possible Modes both of Figure and Motion, as Motion and Figure does all possible Modes of Motion and Figure, (which thereby become *more generical* than any particular Mode of Figure and Motion) he uses the Term *Generical* in one sense

sense in one place, and in another sense in another place. Wherefore it follows from this Argument, that either Thinking is, by consisting of Figures and Motions, a material Action; or else that he uses the Term *generical* fallaciously.

If he uses the Term *generical* in one and the same sense in both places, and pretends it follows from his Argument, that Thinking must, by being more generical than Figure and Motion, consist both of Figures and Motions, and so cannot consist of Motion alone; and would thereby destroy the Supposition, *that Thinking is a Mode of Motion*: I answer, That when Thinking is suppos'd to be a Mode of Motion in the Animal Spirits, the Figure and Structure of them, as well as the principal Parts of a Man, are included, as necessary to constitute an Act of Thinking; for otherwise, neither the Motion of Thinking, nor the various Motions in the Body of a Man could be perform'd; no more than the Mode of Motion, call'd Vegetation, could be perform'd in an Oak, without such an Organical Disposition of Parts, as is peculiar to that kind of Tree call'd an Oak.

If he uses the Term *generical* fallaciously, and not in the same sense that it is us'd, when Figure is said to be *more generical* than Roundness; but for Thinking's containing in it Ideas, &c. that is, for being

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more generical than Motion and Figure, because we have Ideas of Motion and Figure: His Discourse is not to the point, and he might as well have us'd any other Term in the World, as the Term *Generical*. For if he means, that the Objects of *Thinking* are *more generical* than Motion and Figure (as by 3d Def. affirming, *That Thinking contains in it self* p. 21. *the Ideas of all the Modes of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion, and infinite other Ideas besides*; and by what he says in this Article, I am apt to think he does) then what he says is not to the Question in dispute, which has no relation to the *genericalness* of the Objects on which we think, but to the *genericalness* of *Thinking* it self.

Indeed Mr. Clark does help himself out as well as he can, by saying, *That Ideas of Figure, &c. are Modes and Sorts or Kinds of Thinking*. But that, I conceive, is a clear mistake, and a confounding together the Faculty and the Object. I allow there can be no Thinking without an Idea or Object, nor can there be an Idea or Object without Thinking: for they are as relative Ideas as Father and Son, and must therefore subsist together; but yet Thinking, when Roundness is the Object, is no more the material Idea we think on, nor that material Idea, Thinking, than the Idea of *Father* is the Idea of *Son*, or the Idea of *Son* the Idea of *Father*.

2. But let Thinking in Man be whatever Mr. *Clark* pleases ; let it be a Power in an extended Substance that, according to him, consists but of one Figure and one Motion, and not of the Figures and Motions of the Parts, and that is indivisible by the Power of God ; tho one side cannot but be distinct from the other side. Does not that extended Being of Mr. *Clark's*, with one only Figure and one Motion, by means of that suppos'd Power, perceive the Ideas of Figures and Motions ? And if one Power can perceive or have the Idea of another Power, as by Mr. *Clark's* own Supposition he must allow, I see no more reason against making Figures, &c. the Objects of a *Mode of Motion*, than against making them the Objects of any other Power, that exists in a Subject which has neither Modes of Motion, nor Modes of Figure contain'd in it.

3. It must be allow'd, that every distinct Thought is a particular Mode of Thinking ; and so Thinking must in us have a great number of Modes ; but yet for all that our Thoughts are finite and limited. And notwithstanding Mr. *Clark* affirms, *That Thinking in Man contains in it the Ideas of all the Modes of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion* ; yet I take it to be matter of fact, that we comprehend only the more simple Modes of Motion and Figure. And since our Thoughts are all limited, in point of number,

ber, I see no reason from their Variety necessarily to conclude that human Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion. For if we consider but the prodigious Variety of Sounds, which are call'd distinct Modes of Sound, it is as easy to conceive, that upon the supposition of Thinking being a Mode of Motion, it shou'd have the several Modes that we are conscious it has, as that Sound should have all the distinct innumerable Modes which that has.

His fourth Argument to prove *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is a Citation ^{3d Def.} from *Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding*, *which he cannot but suppose I will give some Deference to.* But why should expect any Deference from me to any Man's Words, any further than they carry Evidence along with them, except those of the inspir'd Writers, is as surprizing to me as that *Mr. Locke* should be made choice of as a proper Authority to submit to. However, since *Mr. Clark* is so far mistaken in me as to think, I would pay any more Deference to *Mr. Locke* than I do to him, I will on this occasion freely declare it to be my Opinion, that I look on it to be contrary to the Duty of a rational Agent to pay any man of Deference in matters of Opinion or Speculation to any Man, or Number of Men whatsoever; and that could I so far prostitute my Conscience, as to submit to any mere human Authority, *Mr. Locke's* would in all likelihood be the last for my purpose, because it
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would be much more for my Ease, if not my Profit, to submit to the Decisions and Determinations of those Men that in every Country have worldly Preferments to bestow, than act the same low part out of so poor a Prospect as I must see would follow from believing in so rational an Author as Mr. Locke.

B.4. c. 10.
S. 17.

As to the Passage it self, I refer the Reader to it, who will see, that it is so far from having any relation to the Question that Mr. Clark has been pleas'd to start, whether *human Thinking be a Mode of Motion*, that its whole design is to prove, that Thinking in the Deity cannot depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal System, against such Theists as affirm, that God is a certain System of Matter, and that Thinking is a certain Motion of the Parts of that System. And as the Question is not the same, so some of the Consequences that Mr. Locke draws from those Principles, affect only that really absurd Supposition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in God. For if it be a just Inference, that all Thoughts must be unavoidably accidental and limited, that depend on Motion, as I think it is; it sufficiently proves the Absurdity of those Theists that Mr. Locke argues against, but is no manner of Objection against those imaginary People that maintain, Thinking in Man to be a Mode of Motion.

3d Def.
p. 49.

His fifth Argument, as far as I can understand it, is, That it is not proper to distinguish

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guish Motions and Figures into *Modes* or *Species of Motion and Figure*, and that a man may as well call a *Syllogism* a *Mode* or *Species* of Motion, as call any particular Motion a *Mode* or *Species* of Motion. And for this he *appeals to the common Sense of Mankind*. This Argument has relation only to Propriety of Language, and therefore I can only say this to it: That I have distinct Ideas of several Motions, and distinct Ideas of several Figures, whereby I distinguish those Motions and Figures from one another, as well as I can Figure from Motion: That some of these peculiar Motions and Figures have distinct Names given to them, and consequently those Motions and Figures are as much rank'd into kinds and sorts (tho they may be never call'd kinds or sorts) as any things else in the World. For what do we mean by a Kind or Sort, but several Particulars having a Conformity to an abstract Idea? So that if our abstract Idea of Roundness agrees to the Figure of any number of Beings, we do as necessarily call them all round, and reckon their Figure a sort of Figures, as we do a Negro of the Sort or Species of Men, by his answering or having a Conformity to our abstract Idea of Man, tho the term *Species* or *Sort* may not perhaps be made use of in one case as it is in the other. But after all, I cannot see what ground Mr. *Clark* has to contest this Language with me, who *says* so much about *Figures differing specifically* 3d Def. from one another. Thus ^{p. 12.}

See Reply
P. 21.

3d Def.
P. 53.

Thus I have gone thro his Arguments to prove, that *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, and will conclude what I have to say on this head, with considering the Apology he makes for my maintaining so absurd an Opinion, tho it be only an Opinion he puts upon me, as he did, that I maintain'd *Sweetness existed in a Rose*, in direct defiance of my Words that were before him. He says, *that in reviewing the Matter, he can hardly persuade himself, but that I have mistaken my own Argument.* And his reason is, because *some ingenious Persons have undertaken to maintain, that God can make Matter think*; which it seems, tho a false and impossible Assertion, is not so extravagant an Absurdity as mine: and therefore I presume he thinks, I intended to follow, or should have follow'd those *ingenious Persons*; which is as much as to say, I am more extravagantly absurd than others, therefore I have mistaken my own Argument. I may as well say, that Mr. Clark has mistaken his own Argument, because I think him more mistaken than *Descartes*, and some other *ingenious Persons*, in making the Soul *an extended Being*, and yet indivisible by the Power of God. Have not Mr. Clark, and I, and every Man else, a liberty to judg and argue for our selves? And tho it be very possible for us all to argue in such a manner as will seem *extravagantly absurd* to some Men or other, yet I humbly conceive,

conceive, that we ought not from thence to be charg'd with mistaking our own Arguments. When a Papist argues for *Transubstantiation*, I cannot see, how he can be charg'd with *mistaking his own Argument*; because *some ingenious* Divines of the Church of *England* contend only for a real Presence. If we look into the World, is there not evident proof, that Men professing Learning are capable of believing and defending any Absurdity in nature? Nay, are not almost all the *extravagant* Opinions that abound in the World, chiefly confin'd to those that profess Philosophy and Learning? For as *no living Creature is subject to the Privilege of Absurdity, but Man only*; so the common People, by their Incapacity for Speculation, can enter no farther into the particular Speculations of their Country, than like the common Soldiers of an Army, by showing their Courage and Warmth *for they know not what*. Indeed we have had the Happiness in *England*, to have such rational Parliaments and Convocations, that have establish'd nothing but Truth: Yet an *Englishman* is thereby no more privileg'd from maintaining and believing any, the most *extravagant* Absurdity, than a Man born in *Turkey, France, or Spain*; and that with the same degree of Honesty and Sincerity. Had I contradicted my self, I might be said to have *mistaken my own Argument*; as Mr. Clark may

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justly be said to have done, in making an extended Being, as such, divisible and indivisible at the same time. But to say I have mistaken my own Argument, because I exceed another in Absurdity, is such a *Mistake*, and argues so little insight into the Nature of Man (so prone to Error and Absurdity) that I know not under what *Kind* or *Species* of Mistakes to put it.

2d Def.
p. 15.

3d Def.
p. 62.

To prove the impossibility of Matter's Thinking, Mr. Clark urg'd another Argument, *viz.* That it is absurd to annex Consciousness to so flux a Substance, as the Brain or Spirits: because if such a Substance could be the Seat of that Consciousness, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years since; but also is conscious, that he himself, the same individual Being, was the Doer of them; it would follow, that Consciousness could be transfer'd from one Subject to another; that is, that a Quality could subsist without inhering in any Subject at all.

Ref. p. 57,
58, 28, 29.

To which Argument I answer'd, That no Man has the same numerical Consciousness to day that he had yesterday: the Consciousness he has to day, is a distinct numerical Act from all past Consciousnesses; and can be no more the same numerical individual Consciousness with any of those past Consciousnesses, than the Motion of a System of Matter to day, can be the numerical individual Motion it had yesterday.

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That we are not conscious, that we continue a moment the same individual numerical Being: That we utterly forget or cease to remember a great many things, done in the former part of our Lives, which yet we as certainly did, as ever we did any of those things that we are conscious we did. That we do by degrees forget things partially, which we do not revive by frequent recollection: And that in order to retain the Memory or Consciousness of a past Action, it is necessary to revive the Idea of it, before any considerable Flux of Particles: and by reviving the Idea, we have as perfect a Memory or Consciousness of having done that Action (tho the Brain or Spirits be not compos'd of the same numerical Particles) as we had the day after we did the Action; or as we have of a Triangle, or any other new Idea not before imprinted on the Brain. And if there is every now and then a recollection of a past Action, a Man may be conscious of things done by him, tho he has not one Particle of Matter, the same that he had at the doing of those things, without *Consciousnesses being transfer'd from one Subject to another*, in any absurd sense of those words. And nothing can better account for a total forgetfulness of some things, and partial forgetfulness of others, than the Supposition of Consciousness's inhering in a Substance, whose Particles are in a constant Flux.

3d Def.
P. 63.

But, Mr. Clark says, the Fallacy of this Reply is very evident. For to affirm, that new Matter, perpetually added to a fleeting System, may, by repeated Impressions and Recollections of Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a Memory of what was formerly done by the whole System, is not explaining or proving, but begging the Question, by assuming an impossible Hypothesis. Now as far as I understand any thing of the nature of Arguing; it was not my business, as a Respondent, to prove, but assign an Hypothesis. For assigning an Hypothesis, provided that Hypothesis be possible, is a full Answer to an Argument, whereby the contrary is propos'd to be demonstrated; because what is possible, cannot be reduc'd to an Absurdity. And this I have done in the words I have cited; but whether that Hypothesis be possible or impossible, I leave to be determin'd by every man's Reason; and whether it be not the real Truth of the matter, by every man's Experience. This I am sure of, that Mr. Clark's calling it an impossible Hypothesis, and instead of saying a word to prove it impossible, immediately arguing on the supposition of its Possibility, is begging the Question, and supposing that which he was to prove: whereas I was not to prove, but assign a Supposition or Hypothesis. The Substance of what he adds, while he argues on the supposition of the Possibility of my Hypothesis,

pothesis, relating to the Question of Personal Identity, and the Justice of future Rewards and Punishments, shall be consider'd under another Head.

I had urg'd, That tho from the Immateriality of the Soul, it did follow, that the Substance of the Soul was naturally immortal or indivisible; yet it would by no means follow, that the Soul, consider'd as an actually thinking Being, was naturally immortal: and unless the Soul, as an immaterial Being, did perpetually think or perceive, or as a thinking Being, was naturally immortal, a future State of Rewards and Punishments could not be prov'd from Mr. Clark's Argument; and therefore, it was of *no use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion*, that is, it was of no use to prove what it was design'd for, *viz. a future State of Rewards and Punishments.*

To this Mr. Clark says, *That he supposes it will be granted to be of the greatest use, if it be evident that the Notion he is arguing against, is utterly destructive of Religion.*

Let the Notion he is arguing against be utterly destructive of Religion, it will not therefore follow, that a Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul, is any Proof of a future State of Rewards and Punishments: and if a future State of Rewards and Punishments does not follow from the supposition of the Soul's Immateriality, his Argument is not of any use to that end, for which

Letter to Mr. D. p. 13, 14.

Ref. p. 46, 47.

3d Def. p. 86.

which it was intended ; and no more proves a future State of Rewards and Punishments than any Opinion or Principle, whose Supposition *is utterly destructive of a future State.* For whatever *Medium* does not prove a Proposition, when the pretended Use of that *Medium* is to prove that Proposition ; that *Medium* no more serves that End and Purpose, than the most absurd Proposition in the World. Wherefore it is plain, that his subsequent Arguments, should they prove *my Notion destructive of Religion*, do not prove the Usefulness of his own *Argument* ; and are no more to the Question in dispute, than his Endeavors to prove Roundness consists of *Powers of the same kind*, and that *Thinking* is not a *Mode of Motion*. But to pursue the Complaisance with which I have treated him, I will consider what he says to prove *my Notion destructive of Religion*.

His first Argument to prove *my Notion destructive of Religion*, is, *That if the*
 P. 86, 87. *Mind of Man were nothing but a certain System of Matter, and Thinking nothing but a certain Mode of Motion in that System ; it would follow, that since every Determination of Motion depends necessarily upon the Impulse that causes it, therefore every Thought in a man's Mind must be necessary, and depending wholly upon external Causes ; and there could be no such thing in us, as Liberty, or a Power of Self-Determination. Now what Ends and*
 Purposes

Purposes of Religion, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of serving, needs no long and nice Consideration. To which I answer:

1. I no where affirm, Thinking to be a Mode of Motion in any System of Matter; and therefore let his Argument be ever so just and conclusive, it cannot prove my *Notion destructive of Religion.*

2. But supposing I had affirm'd, *the Mind of Man to be nothing but a certain System of Matter, and that Thinking is a Mode of Motion in that System; and that therefore, there can be no such thing in us, as a Power of Self-Determination, no more than there is in Clocks or Watches: How does it follow, that my Notion is destructive of Religion?*

• Men and Clocks agree in being necessarily determin'd in all their Actions; therefore, says he, they are alike incapable of Religion. I might as well argue, that because an immaterial Substance and a Clock agree, according to Mr. Clark, in being extended; therefore an immaterial Substance is no more capable of Religion than a Clock. For what is it makes a Man a proper Subject of Religion but his Understanding? And what excludes a Clock from being a proper Subject of Religion but the want of a human Understanding? Both are necessarily determin'd in their Actions: The one by the Appearances of Good and Evil, and the other by a Weight or a Spring. But how does this

this Agreement destroy Man's Capacity for Religion? How does it appear, that an intelligent Agent that acts necessarily is not a proper Subject of Religion, because an unintelligent Agent that acts necessarily is not? When Mr. *Clark* proves, that such an intelligent Agent cannot be a proper Subject of Religion, I will allow him, that Man is no more a Subject of Religion than a Clock; nay, I will go further and allow, that there can be no such thing as Religion. For among all the Speculations relating to the human Mind, or any other intelligent Beings, there seems to me nothing more evident than that there cannot exist in any intelligent Being, nor do we enjoy any other liberty than a *Power to do as we will, and forbear as we will*: that is to say, if I have the Will to stay in my Chamber, I have a Power to stay there; and if I have the Will to go out of my Chamber, I have a Power to go out. Let my mind determine either way, I have still the Power to act as I will, unless something happens to hinder me from acting as I will. If I am lock'd up fast, I have no longer my liberty in that respect, I have not then a Power to do as I will; and if I am thrust out by Violence, I am not at liberty in that respect, because I cannot forbear going out, tho I should will not going out. Whenever therefore the doing or forbearing any Action, according to the Determination of my Will,

Will, is in my Power, I am then always free and at liberty, that is, free from any Agents hindring me from acting as I will, but not *free* from *Necessity*. For when I will, or prefer going abroad to staying at home, that act of Volition or Preference as much determines me to act according to that *Preference*, if it is in my power to go abroad; as Locks and Bars will hinder me from acting according to that Preference. The only difference is, that in one case I am necessitated to act as I will, and in the other case to act contrary to my Will.

This seems to me to contain the whole Idea of human *Liberty*. Now, if Mr. *Clark* cannot assign another Idea of *Liberty*, that is intelligible and consistent with it self, and that we can know to be true, by comparing it with the Actions of our Minds, Then if he shows, that a necessary Agent cannot be a Subject of Religion, it will follow from his Principles that Man is not a Subject of Religion. And that he can have no consistent, intelligible Idea of *Liberty*, besides what I have assign'd, I think will be evident to any man, that carefully considers the Actions of intelligent Beings, or endeavors to frame an Idea of *Liberty*, that is distinct from *Necessity*. Upon the best Information I can get, I can put no other intelligible meaning on the Terms *Liberty* or *Self-Determination* for Mr. *Clark*'s purpose, than a *Power to will or chuse differently under*

the same Circumstances: that is, tho I will or prefer staying in my Chamber to leaping out at the Window, yet I could under those very Circumstances, wherein I prefer'd staying in my Chamber, have prefer'd leaping out at Window; which is as much as to say, I could have prefer'd what I did not prefer, tho all the Causes of Preference continu'd. Now this to me is perfectly inconsistent; for whenever I prefer one thing to another, it is always on some Motives or Causes; and I find, that I cannot but prefer what I do prefer, till different Motives or Causes produce another Preference, Choice, or Will: and particularly in the Case before us, the Consideration of the Duty I owe to God and my Country, the Satisfaction I take in living, &c. are some of those Causes that produce that Will or Preference; and therefore to say I can prefer or will differently, under the same Circumstances, is to say, I can prefer what displeases me, than which nothing can be more inconsistent. I know the Doctrine of *Necessity* is too generally suppos'd to be irreligious and atheistical; and I must confess, I cannot but wonder at it, considering that the Predestinarians are so numerous in all the Sects of Christians, and that it is establish'd in so many *Confessions of Faith*. Among the Reform'd I think it cannot be doubted, but that there are more Calvinists than Arminians: and if the *Jansenists* in the Church of Rome are not

not equal in number to their Opposers, their Writings show them to be the most acute and ingenious *Persons* * of that Com- * *Mr. Ar-*
 munion. And if, in the Church of Eng- *nauld, Mr.*
land, its Members incline to Arminianism, *Pascal, Mr.*
 yet it is affirm'd by many, that our Arti- *Nichole,*
 cles are *Calvinistical*, and acknowledg'd by *&c.*
 all, that they were not design'd to exclude
 a *Calvinistical* Meaning : which is a suffici-
 ent ground to presume, that the Compilers
 were *Calvinists*, or at least, that they did
 not think *Calvinism* led to Irreligion. I
 could produce many Divines of our Church
 that in terms teach the *Doctrine of Necessity*
 (for indeed it would be strange, if some
Divines did not maintain what seems so
 evidently the *Doctrine of the Church*)
 but I think it sufficient to name only Dr.
South, whose Penetration, to know what
 is Orthodox, can no more be call'd in ques-
 tion by any man that has look'd into his
 Writings, than his Zeal to be Orthodox
 can be suspected ; when it is consider'd, that
 after declaring what he takes to be the com-
 monly receiv'd *Doctrine of the Church con-*
 cerning the Blessed Trinity, he humbly sub-
 mits it to the Church of England. And I
 look upon his Authority alone to be suffi-
 cient to convince every impartial Reader, that
 a poor Layman may hold the Opinion of
 the Necessity of all Events, as innocently as
 so Reverend a Doctor of the Church, and
 take off from the Force of Mr. *Clark's* Im-

*Animad-
 versions on
 Dr. Sher-
 lock's Vin-
 dication of
 the Trinity,
 p. 240.*

P. 381.

putation of Irreligion on that Principle, since the Doctor has never met with any Censure for asserting it. In his *first Volume of Sermons*, he says, *Providence never shoots at Rovers. There is an Arrow that flies by Night as well as by Day; and God is the Person that shoots it, who can take aim then as well as in the Day. Things are not left to an equilibrium, to hover under an Indifference, whether they shall come to pass or not come to pass; but the whole train of Events is laid before hand, and all proceed by the Rule and Limit of an antecedent Decree. Nay, and sinful*

P. 382.

Actions too are overruled to a certain Issue: even that horrid Villany of the Crucifixion of our Savior was not a thing left to the Disposition of Chance and Incertainty; but in Acts 2. 23. it is said of him, That he was deliver'd to the wicked Hands of his Murderers by the determinate Counsel and Foreknowledge of God. For surely the Son of God could not dye by chance, nor the greatest thing that ever came to pass in nature, be left to an undeterminate Event. Those that sus-

P. 383,

384, 385.

pend the Purposes of God, and the Resolves of an eternal Mind, upon the Actions of the Creature, and make God first wait and expect what the Creature will do (and then frame his Decrees and Counsels accordingly) forget that he is the first Cause of all things, and discourse most unphilosophically, absurdly, and unsutably to the Nature of an infinite Being; whose Influence in every Motion must set the first Wheel

a going. He must still be the first Agent; and what he does he must will and intend to do, before he does it; and what he wills and intends once, he willed and intended from all Eternity: it being grossly contrary to the very first Notions we have of the infinite Perfection of the divine Nature, to state or suppose any new immanent Act in God. The Stoicks indeed held a Fatality, and a fix'd unalterable Course of Events; but then they held also, that they fell out by a Necessity emergent from and inherent in the things themselves, which God himself could not alter: so that they subjected God to the fatal Chain of Causes, whereas they should have resolv'd the Necessity of all inferior Events into the free Determination of God, who executes necessarily that which he purpos'd freely.

In the foregoing words the learned Doctor, in terms, asserts the Necessity of all inferior Events; and tho he distinguishes between the Christian and Stoical Necessity, yet that is only with relation to the Cause of that Necessity. A Necessity founded on the Will of God, must as much destroy the Power of Self-determination in Man, as if that Necessity was founded on a Chain of Causes.

But let us suppose, that the Necessity of all Actions was destructive of all Religion, by destroying the Power of Self-determination; I desire Mr. Clark, who maintains the Certainty of all Events, to show what different

Boyle's
Lectures,
vol. I.
p. 209,
210, 211.

Influence the suppos'd Necessity of our Actions can have on the *Power of Self determination*, that the supposition of the *Certainty of our Actions* has not. If every Action, and the least circumstance of it, be certain to exist before they do exist; can I possibly have a Power to act contrary to such an Action, or any Circumstance of it, any more than I can contrary to an Action that will necessarily exist? Now unless he can show such a difference between the Certainty and Necessity of all Actions, whereby it may appear that the Necessity of all Actions destroys all *Power of Self-determination*, and the Certainty of all Actions does not; he must give up Religion on his Principles: or if he quits them, he must own with me, that Religion is consistent with maintaining the Necessity of all Events. ●

Lectures,
vol. II.
p. 255,
256.
p. 128.

Besides, Mr. Clark must suppose, that God himself can have no other Liberty, but a *Liberty to do or forbear according as he wills*, when he says, *That the necessary and eternal different Relations, which different things bear to one another, always and necessarily do determine the Will of God; and that God is unalterably determin'd to do always what is best in the whole.* For if the Will of God is always necessarily and unalterably determin'd, how can he have a *Power of Self-determination*, as before explain'd; that is, How can he will differently under the same Circumstances? And if his Will be necessarily determin'd,

min'd, what other Liberty can be attributed to the Deity but a Power to do all that he wills, and to forbear what he wills the forbearance of? The force of Truth has produc'd these Expressions from Mr. *Clark*, and he is desir'd to reconcile them with his Censure of the Author of *the Essay of*, &c. for^{3d Def.} asserting only the same Opinion; and not^{p. 87.} only so, but to reconcile the Power of *Self-determination* in Man, with his Principle of *God's Will being necessarily determin'd*. For if he considers the matter, he will find, that as God's Will is necessarily determin'd by what is really best, so the Human Will must always be determin'd by what seems best; and that it is impossible to conceive, but that every intelligent Being, that has a Power of Action, must be thus determin'd; nay that the Perfection of intelligent Beings, as distinguish'd from unintelligent Beings, lies in being determin'd by appearing Good and Evil, and a Power of acting pursuant to those appearances. What would Man have, or can he wish for more than to have a Will, Election and Choice, and a Power to do as he wills or chuses? Would he be able to chuse or will Pain, when he wills or chuses Pleasure? or would he, when he wills or chuses Pleasure, be capable of acting contrary to his Will? that is, would he be so miserable a Being, as to be able to will Pain under the notion of Pain, or by acting contrary to

his Will or Choice have all his Actions involuntary? both which must follow from a suppos'd Power in Man, to will or chuse differently under the same circumstances, and from a Power to act contrary to what he wills. But God be thank'd we are in a much better State, we are surrounded with Objects, which so far as they seem preferable one to another, we do, and cannot help willing or preferring; and while we will or prefer them, we cannot help acting agreeable to that Will or Preference: and nothing but Violence offer'd to us can hinder us from acting agreeable to our Wills; which Compulsion or Violence sure no one can desire. Indeed we are a little restrain'd in our Liberty. If we will going into the Moon, or no further than the Atmosphere, we are not at liberty to act as we will; for had we a Liberty in all cases to act as we will, we should be omnipotent.

3d Def. His next Argument to prove *my Notion*
 p. 87, 88. *destructive of Religion, is, That the Doctrine of the Resurrection will be inconceivable and incredible, and Justice of Rewards and Punishments impossible to be made out.*

What he says to make out this point, being founded on the Question of Identity, it will not be amiss to state briefly my Opinion, before I consider his Exceptions.

A particular Substance, I call the same Substance that it was formerly, from its perfect Agreement to that Idea which I then

then suppos'd it correspondent to. As for instance, the Identity of a material Substance, at different times, lies in consisting of exactly the same numerical Particles, to which no Addition or Subtraction has been made.

2. A particular Mode (as suppose any particular Mode of Motion) not being capable of a Continuation of Existence, like *Being* and *Substance*, but perishing the moment it begins; its Identity cannot consist in being the same numerical Mode of Motion at different times, but only in being that Mode of Motion that it was when it existed, and not another Mode of Motion. In like manner, any particular Act of Consciousness is incapable of the Continuation of its Existence; wherefore its Identity can only consist in being that very numerical Act of Consciousness that it is.

3. The Identity of an *Oak*, *Animal*, or *Man*, consists in a participation of a continu'd Life, under a particular Organization of Parts. An Oak that contains several Loads of Timber, is call'd the same Oak with an Oak that was an Inch long an hundred Years ago, by partaking thence forward of a continu'd vegetable Life, in a like continu'd Organization of Parts: and an Animal or Man is call'd the same Animal or Man at twenty Years old, that it was at a quarter old, by partaking of a continu'd Animal Life, under a like continu'd Organization of Parts; let this vegetable

table and animal Life in the Oak, Animal or Man, be united at different times, to ever so different Particles of Matter.

4. Besides these sorts of Identity, there is a fourth very different from these, which we signify by the word *Self*, and sometimes call *Personal Identity*. Now to understand what it is that constitutes *Self* or *Personal Identity*, let us consider to what Ideas we apply the term *Self*. If a man charges me with a Murder done by some body last night, of which I am not conscious; I deny that I did the Action, and cannot possibly attribute it to my *Self*, because I am not conscious that I did it. Again, suppose me to be seiz'd with a short Frenzy of an hour, and during that time to kill a man, and then to return to my *Self* without the least Consciousness of what I have done; I can no more attribute that Action to my *Self*, than I could the former, which I suppos'd done by another. The mad Man and the sober Man are really two as distinct Persons as any two other men in the World, and will be so consider'd in a Court of Judicature, where want of Consciousness can be prov'd: and it will be thought as unjust to punish the sober Man for what the mad Man did, as to punish one Man for another's Fault, tho the Man both sober and mad is the same Man.

And lastly, should there be so strong a Representation to my Understanding of a
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Murder done by me (which was really never done at all) so that I could not distinguish it in my mind from something *really* done by me ; I can no more help attributing this to my *Self*, than I can any other Action which I really did, and was conscious of. So that it is evident, that *Self* or Personal Identity consists solely in Consciousness ; since when I distinguish my *Self* from others, and when I attribute any past Actions to my *Self*, it is only by extending my Consciousness to them. And further, to give the Reader an Idea of the Nature of Personal Identity, let him consider, That our Limbs or Flesh, while vitally united to *Thinking conscious Self*, are part of our selves ; but when separated from us, are no part of *Self*, but that Flesh which succeeds in the room of the Flesh separated, becomes as much a part of *Self* as the separated piece of Flesh was before.

The Question then between Mr. Clark and me is, whether upon supposition that Personal Identity consists in Consciousness, and that Consciousness is only a Mode in a fleeting System of Matter, the Doctrine of the *Resurrection will be incredible, and the Justice of future Rewards and Punishments impossible to be made out.*

Mr. Clark says, *If Thinking be in reality* ^{3d Def.} *nothing but a Mode, which inhering in a loose* ^{p. 88.} *and fleeting System of Matter, perishes utterly at the Dissolution of the Body ; then the*
restoring

restoring the Power of Thinking to the same Body at the Resurrection, will not be a raising again of the same individual Person; but it will be as truly a Creation of a new Person, as the Addition of the like Power of thinking to a new Body now would be the Creation of a new Man.

To which I answer, that if *Personal Identity* consists in Consciousness, as before explain'd; and if Consciousness be a Mode in a fleeting System of Matter, Consciousness can perish no more at the Dissolution of the Body, than it does every moment we cease to think, or be conscious. Suppose we were taken to pieces every night after we are asleep, and our parts put into the same Form and Order which they would have been in in the morning had we continu'd sleeping; I think it is not to be doubted, but we should have the same Consciousness or Memory that we should have had in our natural State. Consciousness is no more created anew in one case than in the other; there is only a Suspension of the Operation of Thinking: Therefore the restoring the Power of Thinking to the same (or if you please a different) Body at the Resurrection, with a Memory or Consciousness extending to past Actions, will be a raising the same Person and not a Creation of a new Person, *as adding the like Power of Thinking to a new Body now would be the Creation of a new Man*; because the Identity of Man, consisting in a participation of a continu'd

tinu'd *Life*, under a particular Organization of Parts, must be new created whenever such a *Life* begins; whereas, if Personal Identity consists in Consciousness, or a Memory extending to past Actions, *that* will make any one as much the same Person that he was in this World, as any one is the same Person here two days together. *That Memory or Consciousness* preserves him from being a *new Person*, (the Essence whereof *ex hypothesi* consists in having a Power of Thinking that cannot be extended backwards.)

2. But if Mr. Clark means by the *same individual Person* in the Paragraph I cited, the *same numerical Being* with the *same individual numerical Consciousness* at different times, as I suppose he does, since therein consists his Notion of Personal Identity (as the Reader may see, if he will read the ^{3d Def.} places refer'd to in the Margin) I do allow, ^{p. 62 to 69. p. 87 to the end.} that such an individual Person cannot be rais'd at the Resurrection. Nay, I think it is demonstrable, that there can be no Resurrection at all of the *same Person* on that Supposition. And thus I demonstrate it.

1. Being as Being cannot be rewarded or suffer.

2. Being only as Conscious or Thinking can be rewarded or suffer.

3. Human Thinking or Consciousness consists of a number of particular Acts of Thinking or Consciousness, which whether they reside in a fleeting or indivisible Substance,

stance, can each of them have but one Existence, and cannot possibly exist at different times as Substances do, but perish the moment they begin.

4. Since it is not possible for those individual numerical Acts of Thinking or Consciousness that are past, to exist again; the same numerical Being, with the same numerical individual Consciousness, cannot exist at two different times, and consequently cannot possibly be rewarded or punish'd for an Action done.

5. Therefore if Personal Identity consists in the same numerical Being, with the same individual numerical Consciousness, there can be no Resurrection of the *same Person*; nay there can be no such thing as the *same Person* at two different times.

So that upon the whole, my Notion of Personal Identity is so far from contradicting the Doctrine of the Resurrection, or making it *impossible or incredible*, that there can only be a Resurrection of the *same Person*, on these Principles, That present *Consciousness* or Memory is *nothing but a present Representation of a past Action*, and that *Personal Identity* consists only in having such a *Consciousness* or Memory. For on these Suppositions, a particular Consciousness or Memory of past Actions can begin at the Resurrection as well as after a Night's sleep; whereas, if the *same numerical individual*

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dual Consciousness, that existed in this World, is to exist at the Resurrection, as Mr. Clark maintains, he requires a Condition in order to a Resurrection that implies a Contradiction.

There seems to me but one Objection more to my Notion of *Personal Identity* that requires a Solution, and that is as follows: *That if the Addition of a like Con-* ^{3d Def.}
sciousness with what Mr. Clark now finds in ^{P. 90.}
himself to any System of those Particles of Dust, which in the course of twenty Years have successively been part of the Substance of his Body, and are enough to form several Bodys at the Resurrection, will constitute the same Person with himself; the Addition of the like Consciousness to all those Systems, would consequently make every one of them to be, not Persons like him, but the same individual Person with him, and with each other likewise, which is the greatest Absurdity in the World, an Absurdity equal to Transubstantiation. It is making them all to be one and the same individual Person, at the same time that they remain ^{P. 86.}
several and distinct Persons.

1. To which Objection I answer, by asking him, If these thinking Beings can know themselves to be the same or different Persons any other way, but purely by Consciousness? And I ask him, whether each of 'em must not unavoidably think himself the *same Person* with Mr. Clark? If each conscious Being cannot help thinking himself to be the same Person with Mr.

Clark,

Clark, it is past doubt, that nothing can be meant by the term *Self*, but purely a present Representation of past Actions, or a Consciousness extending it self to past Actions, without regard to Sameness or change of Substance. Wherefore I do allow, that each of those Beings would be the *same Person* with *Mr. Clark*, that is, each of 'em would have a present Representation of the past Actions of *Mr. Clark* (for that is what I understand, and what I think every man must unavoidably signify by the term *Self*, or by *Sameness* of Person.) And if each thinking Being is in that sense the *same Person* with *Mr. Clark*; and if Sameness of Person or *Self* consists in having a present Representation of a past Action, and applying that Action to a man's self, let there be ever so many thinking Beings that have a present Representation of a past Action, they can all constitute but one and the same Person, because they all agree in, or have a present Representation of the same past Action, wherein *Self* or Personal Identity consists; as my consisting of ever so great a Bulk of Matter, or ever so many distinct Beings, does not constitute different Persons, but constitutes what we call *Self*, by the Sympathy and Concern I have for each part united to me, tho I have a distinct Act of Sensation for each part that is at any time affected. I suppose *Mr. Clark*, when he expects any deference should be given to an Authority he

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cites against me, will pay the same deference to the same Authority that he expects I should ; and therefore on this occasion I shall give him Mr. Locke's own words, who says, *It must be allow'd, That if the same* B.2.c.27.
Consciousness can be transfer'd from one think- S. 12.
ing Substance to another (as in a certain sense he evidently shows that it may be) *it will be possible that two thinking Substances may make but one Person.*

2. It is an Article of Christian Faith, that the same Numerical Particles that are laid in the Grave shall be rais'd at the Resurrection. And since God Almighty has made that necessary by the Declaration of his Will ; the *same Person* will at the Resurrection only exist in those very Numerical Particles that were laid in the Grave ; by virtue of which, Personal Identity or *Self* will begin in the same manner at the Resurrection, as it does in the Morning when we awake from sleep. Besides, if God shou'd cause to exist twenty present Representations of the same past sinful Actions in so many distinct Beings, the consequent Punishment would be twenty times as much as the sinful Actions deserv'd, and his Justice requir'd. Wherefore if God will not punish for Punishment-sake, as to be sure he will not, there cannot be two distinct thinking Beings, with each of 'em a Consciousness extending to the same past Actions, and attributing them to themselves.

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3. But supposing that each of these twenty distinct Beings is the *same Person* with Mr. Clark (which *ex hypothesi* is true) and supposing further, that they can be consider'd as distinct *Persons* from one another (which yet is not the Case, as the Reader may see by what I have said before) yet I humbly conceive Mr. Clark will not upon recollection say, this is an Absurdity equal to *Transubstantiation*, but will rather chuse to call it, a *Difficulty that cannot be perfectly clear'd*, when he considers that it is one of the Articles of our Christian Faith, to believe that two compleat Persons, singly consider'd, *viz.* the second Person in the Trinity and a Human Person, do constitute, by an Hypostatical Union, but one Person.

4. But as to his own Scheme, besides the Absurdity of making the same *individual numerical Consciousness* necessary to constitute the *same Person*, I think there follows another Absurdity from his making the same Numerical Being necessary to constitute *Self*, or the *same Person*. For how can he account for the Resurrection on the following Case? Suppose a Man lives, and believes as a good Christian ought to do for forty Years, and then has a Distemper in his Body which obliterates all the Ideas lodg'd in the numerical individual immaterial Substance; so that on his recovery there remains no Memory, no Conscious-

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ness of any Idea that he perceiv'd for forty Years past. And further suppose this Numerical, Individual, Immaterial Substance, to get Ideas again as a young Child does, and till its separation from the Body, leads a dissolute and debauch'd Life. Here on my Principles is the same Being at different times, as much two Persons as any two Men in the World are two Persons, or as the same Man mad and sober is two Persons. Now I ask him whether or no they are two distinct Persons? If he answers, that they are two distinct Persons; I ask him, how one of them can be punish'd eternally, and the other eternally rewarded, on supposition that the same numerical individual Substance is necessary to constitute the *same Person*? And if they are two Persons, whether Personal Identity must not consist in Consciousness alone, without any regard to its existing in the same or different Substances? If he answers that they are not two Persons, but one Person; I ask him, Whether he can suppose this Being rewardable or punishable? And what kind of Consciousness it will have, when it is either rewarded or punish'd? When he has answer'd these Questions to himself, and will give himself the trouble to consider Mr. Locke's Chapter of *Identity and Diversity*, he will see, that let him frame what imaginary Schemes of *Personal Identity* he pleases, if there lie not unanswerable Ob-

jections against them all, except that of *Personal Identity consisting in Consciousness*, yet at least that Experience perfectly contradicts his Notion of *Personal Identity*, which consists in *an Individual Numerical Being, with the same Numerical Consciousness*. And when he sees the impossibility of the *same Numerical Consciousness* continuing a moment in a Finite Being, but that every moment's Consciousness is a new Action, and nothing but bringing the Idea of a past Action into view; he may perhaps see the needlessness of contesting whether *Self* or *Personal Identity* must inhere in the same or different Beings at different times: because he may then as easily conceive that the *same Consciousness* may exist in different Beings at different times, as in the same Numerical Being at different times; and may have as clear an Idea of *Personal Identity* continuing under the greatest change of Substance, as he may have an Idea of Animal or Human *Identity*, which consisting in a continued Life, under a like continued organization of Parts, cannot be destroy'd by the greatest change or flux of Particles imaginable. Tho' after all, was a Flux of Particles absolutely inconsistent with *Personal Identity*, God Almighty could as easily preserve the most loose Particles from a separation, as he can an immaterial or unextended Being from Annihilation.

As to what Mr. Clark says about the
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Injustice of Punishment, on supposition that *Personal Identity* consists in Consciousness, and that Consciousness is a Mode of Motion in a System of Matter ; it is to no purpose to enter into that Question, till we are agreed on the Ends and Reasons of both Temporal and Eternal Punishment, which he has not as yet assign'd. And when he assigns what I take to be the true Ends of Punishment, both in this World and the next, it will be then time enough to show, that they may all take place on my Principles, as they can on any Principles whatsoever.

Being come to a conclusion of what I think fit to reply to Mr. *Clark's Third Defence* on the Head of the Possibility of Matter's Thinking, I will, out of a desire to have this Argument put on its true foot, observe in this place, That Mr. *Clark* and I have only spoken of Matter so far forth as is knowable, *viz. as Solid* ; and the Question between us has bin in effect, Whether Thinking can be an Affection of Solidity ? And therefore should he have demonstrated with the greatest clearness the Impossibility of all I have said (as I humbly conceive it is quite the contrary) yet for all that, he cannot upon his Principles prove that there are different kinds of Substances in the World. For since he supposes, *That we are* ^{Lectures, Vol. I.} *utterly ignorant of the Substance or Essence of* ^{p. 76, 77,} *all things, and, That there is no Substance in* ^{79.} *the World of which we know any thing further*

than only a certain number of its Propertys or Attributes, it is absolutely impossible for him to prove, that there are two different Substances in the World ; because, having no Idea of the *Substance of Matter*, nor of the *Substance of a Being distinct from Matter*, it is impossible for him to know, that the *Substance* of one is not the *Substance* of the other, or that there exists any other Substance but the Substance of Matter.

He can only know a thing to be true, either by Intuition, or by perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas by the help of intermediate Ideas.

He cannot know that the *Substance* of Matter and the *Substance of Spirit*, or Being distinct from Matter, are not the same by Intuition, when he has no Idea of either; for that would be to say, that he perceiv'd a difference when he perceiv'd no difference at all.

Nor can he perceive or know, that there is a difference between them by the help of an intermediate Idea, because no intermediate Idea can discover any Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, but by being plac'd between two Ideas. Now no intermediate Idea can be plac'd between two Ideas of things, when there is no Idea of either, no Subject of Comparison. Suppose a brass Farthing put into one Box, and a Ring into another Box ; how is it possible for a man that has no Idea of either by any intermediate

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mediate Idea, to know whether they differ from one another or no? And suppose one man should affirm to another who has no Ideas to the terms *Three Angles of a Triangle and two right Angles*, that three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; how is it possible for him to know their Equality by the help of any intermediate Ideas under that Ignorance? Other Angles can never show him the Agreement of *he knows what with he knows not what*, no more than if he was show'd the Sun or the Moon.

All that I can find said against this most evident Demonstration by Mr. Clark, to whom it has been objected, is, *That from the demonstrable Attributes of God, and from the known Propertyts of Matter, we have un-* Preface to his second Volume of Lectures. *answerable Reasons to convince us, that their Essences are intirely different, tho we know not distinctly what those Essences are. The Attributes of God, says he, are, that he is Self-existent, Eternal, Infinite, Intelligent, Free, Wise, &c. The known Propertyts of Matter are, adds he, That it is not Self-existent, but Dependent, Finite, Divisible, Passive, Unintelligent, &c. But by what intermediate Idea does it appear, that the Substance of Matter is not Self-existent, but Dependent, Finite, Passive, Divisible, Unintelligent, &c? Nay, is it not suppos'd by our having no Idea of the Substance of Matter, that we cannot possibly know whether it be Self-*

existent, Dependent, Finite, Passive, Divisible, Unintelligent, or no? How then can Mr. Clark on his own Principles know, that the Substance of Matter is not *Self-existent*? &c. There is nothing in Matter that appears to be *Dependent, Passive, not Self-existent, Finite, &c.* but Solidity and the Affections thereof. The Substance in which Solidity inheres we have no Idea of, and consequently cannot affirm of it, that it is *Finite, Divisible, or Unintelligent, or not Self-existent.* So that it is evident, that Mr. Clark and all those Gentlemen who say, we are intirely ignorant of the Substances and Essences of things, or have no Idea at all of them, cannot take a step to prove, that there are different Substances in the World, without contradicting themselves, and supposing, that they are not utterly ignorant, but that they have an Idea of the Substances and Essences of things, when at the same time they confess, that they are utterly ignorant or have no Idea at all of the Substances and Essences of things.

Essay of
H. V.
B. 2. c. 23.
§. 5.

Mr. Locke, who speaks always of a Substance as something unknown, and of which we have no Idea, whether it be apply'd to material or immaterial Substances, but a mere relative Idea of a Support, might very justly argue, That from our not having any Notion of the Substance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its Non-existence, than we can for the same reason deny the Existence of

of Body. *It being as Rational*, says he, to affirm, there is no Body because we cannot know its Essence, as 'tis call'd, or have no Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we know not its Essence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Substance. For on the supposition of our having no Idea of Substance, and that Substance is something distinct from what are usually call'd Property's, it will be impossible for any *Spinozist* or Materialist to prove, that there is no other Substance in the Universe but material Substance. But then on the other side it will be as impossible for such an Immaterialist to prove, that there must necessarily be two kinds of Substances, because by having no Idea either of the Substance of Matter or the Substance of Spirit, he cannot know but that the Substance of Matter is the Substance of Spirit. From what I have said it is evident, that Mr. Clark, and those that are of his mind, cannot possibly, upon their own Principles, prove the Necessity of Thinking's inhering in an immaterial Being. For tho' they should prove, that Thinking cannot inhere in Matter because it is solid, and consequently divisible; yet that is no more than to say, that *Thinking cannot be an Affection of Solidity*: for that is what they must mean when they say, *Thinking cannot inhere in Matter*, because having no Idea of the Substance of Matter, they can only say, Think-
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ing cannot inhere in that part of Matter of which we have an Idea. Wherefore, supposing Mr. Clark to argue right, *that Thinking cannot inhere in Matter*, that is, cannot be an Affection of Solidity, it would by no means follow, that it may not be made an Affection of, or be annex'd to that Substance which is vested with Solidity. For of that Substance we are suppos'd to have no Idea, and consequently cannot exclude it from a possibility of thinking any more than from a possibility of being solid.

Letter to
the Bp of
W. p. 16.

Mr. Locke, to justify the Consideration of Substance as an unknown Support, in which Propertys inhere, says, *A Philosopher that says, Substance (or that which supports Accidents) is something he knows not what, and a Countryman that says the Foundation of the great Church at Harlem is supported by something he knows not what, and a Child that stands in the dark on his Mother's Muff, and says, he stands upon something he knows not what; in this respect talk exactly like.* Now I humbly conceive, that they may not all talk exactly alike in this respect, for the Countryman and Child may have a clear abstract Idea of solid Being or Matter, a Species whereof the Countryman may imagine the Church at Harlem, and the Child himself supported by; whereas the Philosopher has no Idea at all: For let the Philosopher strip any part or piece of Matter of Solidity, and nothing conceivable remains,

remains, nothing on which Solidity can inhere: for as to that portion of space, in which it existed, that could not be the Substance in which it inher'd, because that portion of space in which it existed, was really distinct from the material Substance, and accidental to it: for that portion of space exists immutably and perpetually in the same place (if I may so speak) tho ever so many particular material Substances are coextended to it, and then remov'd from it.

But as far as I can judg, all this talk of the Essences of things being unknown, is a perfect mistake: and nothing seems clearer to me, than that the Essence or Substance of Matter consists in Solidity, and that the Essence or Substance of a Being, distinct from Matter, must consist in want of Extension, and is truly defin'd an *unextended Being*. For nothing can be conceiv'd to be coextended with the parts of space (if I may so speak) but what is solid. And therefore to make immaterial Being extended (as Mr. Clark does) is to make immaterial Being material, which indeed is but of a piece with his making an extended Being indivisible, tho he has no other Reason to make all Matter divisible, but because it is extended.

As to what he has said against material Impulse being the Cause of *Gravitation*, the whole is founded on this, That because

From p. 70
to 80.

New Ex-
periments
touching
the Air,
4to, p. 10.

a Bullet, a Feather, and a piece of Leaf-gold descend with equal swiftness in *vacuo* (that is, in a Vessel out of which the Air is exhausted, or according to Mr. Boyle's Definition of the term *Vacuum*, in the like case, by which he understands not a space wherein there is no Body at all, but such as is either altogether, or almost totally devoid of Air) therefore material Impulse cannot be the Cause of Gravitation. I use the Term *vacuum* in the aforesaid sense, because it is so far from being evident that all Matter is exhausted (tho it should be granted, that there is no perfect *Plenum* there) that there are Experiments which prove, that Body remains there after the Air is exhausted, and that does receive actual Modifications by Motion from Bodys without the Vessel. And if so, a Bullet, a Feather, and a piece of Leaf-gold may descend in *vacuo*, as Mr. Clark calls it, with equal swiftness, by virtue of the Impulse of those parts of Matter that are contiguous to them, as that Lead under different forms ascends or descends according to the Pressure of the circumambient Air. And as to that external Motion, which is the Cause of that Mode of Motion call'd *Gravitation*, I think the Experiment of several pieces of Thred, ty'd to the inside parts of a Hoop, all tending to a Center, upon a Globe's being whirl'd round its Axis in the middle of the Hoop, and

and this further Experiment of Bodys not descending *in vacuo*, as Mr. Clark calls it, with the same Velocity at a greater distance, as they do near the Earth, evidently shew, that the Motion of the Earth is a proximate Cause of the *Gravitation* of Bodys in our Neighborhood, and do discover the Cause of Gravitation throughout the material Universe. But however this be, unless Mr. Clark proves, that there is a real *vacuum* in Nature, that is, that there are some portions of space without Body; and unless he proves withal, that there can be an intire Portion of space in a Vessel without any the least Particle of Matter, so that he may try whether Bodys weigh or descend without the least Contact from other Bodys; he will not be able to prove, that material Impulse is not the Cause of Gravitation: and I may in the mean while say what I think, that could any Body be at first so situated as to be surrounded with nothing but pure space, there would be no beginning of Motion, no Weight, no Gravitation in that Body. This I humbly conceive is sufficient to obviate all he has advanc'd without proof under this Article: for as to his Treatment of me I pass it all by, except one particular and extraordinary liberty he has taken, *viz.* his saying that I *insinuate to my Reader, that* ^{3d Def.} Sir Isaac Newton is of my Opinion in the ^{p. 76.} present Question; and to that will say no more

more than assure the Reader, that it is a pure Fiction.

P. 80.

He says, *That the great Phenomena of Nature (and particularly that of Gravitation) cannot possibly depend upon any mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion, but must be produc'd (that is, constantly) by the Force and Action of some higher Principle: And so leading us even with mathematical Certainty to immaterial Powers; and finally to the Creator of the World.*

Boyle's
Inquiry in-
to the vul-
gar Notion
of Nature,
P. 66.

But the Honorable Robert Boyle was of Opinion, *That it seems manifest enough, that whatsoever is done in the World, at least where the rational Soul intervenes not, is really effected by Corporeal Causes and Agents acting in a World so fram'd as ours, is according to the Laws settl'd by the omniscient Author of things.* And, that as it more recommends the Skill of an Engineer to contrive an elaborate Engine, so as that there need nothing to reach his ends in it, but the Contrivance of Parts devoid of Understanding; than if it were necessary that ever and anon a discreet Servant should be employ'd to concur notably to the Operations of this or that part, or to hinder the Engine from being out of Order: So it more sets off the Wisdom of God in the Fabrick of the Universe, that he can make so vast a Machine perform all those many things, which he design'd it should, by the mere Contrivance of Brute Matter manag'd by certain Laws of Motion, and upheld by his ordinary

P. 7.

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and general Concourse; than if he employ'd from time to time an intelligent Overseer to regulate and controul the Motion of the parts. And therefore could it be prov'd, that the grand Phenomena of Nature depended on the constant Force and Action of immaterial Beings, it would, according to Mr. Boyle, argue a less degree of Wisdom, than if they depended on the mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion, and consequently overturn the Existence of an infinitely perfect Being, by not attributing to him the highest Wisdom we can possibly conceive.

2. But let this matter be as it will, I conceive this Argument of Mr. Clark's for the Existence of God, or the Creator of all things, is as obscure and defective, as he thinks Descartes's Argument from the Idea of God, is. Lectures,
Vol. I. p. 38. For the true Question being, whether there has existed from all Eternity one immaterial Being of infinite Perfections, that created Matter and every thing else ex nihilo; how does it follow, that such a Being exists, from the mere supposition of the Existence of two Beings of different kinds? for it does not necessarily follow from that supposition that one must have created the other ex nihilo; and therefore other Mediums are necessary to prove that point.

To infer a Creator of one Being or Substance from the mere Existence of two kinds of Beings or Substances, is a reasoning nowhere extant in the old profane Authors, who

Burnetii
Arch. Phil.
P. 315.

who had not so much as a word to signify the Production of things *ex nihilo*, and therein agreed with the Jews, who (as the same Author observes) every where apply the Hebrew word, which we render *Creation*, to express other Actions and Effects than a Production of Matter *ex nihilo*. The Question therefore of a Creator *ex nihilo* is a modern Question; and consequently out of Reverence to sacred and profane Antiquity, it became Mr. Clark not barely to suppose the mere Existence of two Beings of different kinds sufficient to demonstrate the Creation of one of them *ex nihilo*.

Clark's
Lect. Vol. I.
P. 15.

3. Since, on occasion of the *Boylean Lecture*, the Existence of God is often made a Question (which otherwise would be with few any Question at all) and since the Gentlemen that preach that Lecture propose to prove the Existence of God by the Rules of demonstrative Argumentation (and thereby give Men a right to expect Demonstration) I shall, out of the Inclination I have to see the Foundation of all Religion establish'd on Demonstration, and to gratify that Desire which even Atheists (as Mr. Clark observes) must of Necessity own they have to see a Truth establish'd, that is so much for the Benefit and Happiness of Men; for, says he, on whatever Hypothesis they proceed, Nothing is so certain, as that Man, consider'd without the Protection and Conduct of a superior Being, is in a far worse Case, than upon

Ib. p. 6.

P. 9.

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upon the supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour (from whence it seems to follow, That Atheists, according to Mr. Clark, even while they continue so, have no reason to fear any thing for their disbelief) I say, I shall conclude this Debate with an Essay, showing a way how to demonstrate the Existence of God, since Demonstration is thought so necessary in the case, tho I should think Probability enough to determine any man. As far as I can judg of the Opinions of Strato, Xenophanes, and some other antient Atheists from a few Sentences of theirs which yet remain, and of the Opinions of that Set call'd the *Literati* in China, from the Accounts we have in the several Voyages thither, and more particularly from Father Gobien's Preface before his *Histoire de l'edit de l'Empereur de la Chine en faveur de la Religion Chretienne*, 8to. Par. 1698. they seem all to me to agree with Spinoza (who in his *Opera Posthuma* has endeavour'd to reduce Atheism into a System) that there is no other Substance in the Universe but Matter, which Spinoza calls God, and Strato, Nature. And this System is thus describ'd by Manilius, Lib. 1.

*Omnia mortali mutantur lege creatâ.
 Nec se cognoscant terra vertentibus annis
 Exutas. Variant faciem per sæcula gentes.
 At manet incolumis mundus suaq; omnia
 (servat,
 Quæ nec longa dies auget, minuitq; senectus.
 Nec motus puncto currit, cursusq; fatigat :
 Idem semper erit, quoniam semper fuit Idem.
 Non alium vidère Patres, aliumve Nepotes
 Aspicient. Deus est qui non mutatur in
 (ævum.*

Now to answer these Atheists demonstratively, and on Principles which will stand the Test, I am so far of Mr. Clark's mind, as to think that we ought to prove the Creation of Matter *ex nihilo*; or which is all one, that Matter is not a self-existent Being. For if once Matter be allow'd to be a self-existent Being, we Christians who believe but in one self-existing Being, are oblig'd by our own reasoning to allow Matter all possible Perfections, and to exclude every thing else from being Self-existent : Because it is from the Idea of Self-existence, that we infer the Perfections of God. Besides, should we admit two Self-existing Beings, *Spirit* and *Matter*, we could not then be able to prove, but that there may be Self-existing Beings in Infinitum, and a plurality

lity of Gods, which is as inconsistent with the Being of God, or a Creator, as the Self-existence of Matter. Wherefore it is evident, that to avoid the two dangerous Extrems of believing, either that nothing exists but the material Universe, or that Beings of different kinds necessarily exist, we must not only know that Beings of different kinds exist (which Mr. *Clark* thinks sufficient to prove a Creator) but we must have an Idea how it is possible for Matter not always to have existed : And then it will evidently follow, that what we can conceive possible not always to have existed, cannot be a Self-existing Being, and consequently that there must be a God or a Creator of Matter.

Now the way to prove, *That Matter is not Self-existent*, or, which is all one, *the Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, is to form to our selves an Idea of the *Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, as we have an Idea of the several Powers of Matter beginning to exist without any preceding Existence ; for unless we have an Idea of the *Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, we must inevitably conclude Matter a Self-existent Being. For what is a Self-existing Being, but a Being which we cannot but conceive existing? And what is the Idea of *Creation ex nihilo*, but an Idea of the Possibility of the Existence

Essay of
H. U. B. 4.
c. 10, S. 18.

of Matter, or an Idea how Matter may begin to exist? as our Idea of the Creation of the Powers of Matter, is an Idea of the Possibility of those Powers beginning to exist; of which we have as clear a Conception, as we have that any Powers of Matter do really exist. Now to get an Idea of Creation, or a Conception how Matter might begin to exist, we must (as the incomparable Mr. Locke with great modesty expresses himself) *emancipate ourselves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts as far as they can reach to a closer contemplation of things; and then we may be able to aim at some dim and seeming Conception, how Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the Power of the Eternal First Being.* But as he thought that *this would lead him too far from the Notions, on which the Philosophy now in the World is built, and that it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them;* so the small compass of this Treatise, and the great labour of shewing the falshood of so many receiv'd Prejudices and Opinions as is necessary to give an Idea of Creation *ex nihilo*, must make it more pardonable in me (who own myself to be infinitely below him in Abilities) if I omit for the present so useful a Design, or should leave it intirely to some of those Gentlemen that are appointed annually to preach at the Lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle.

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Before I conclude, it may be expected that I should take some notice of the Expressions of Contempt us'd towards me in Mr. *Clark's Third Defence*. But to every thing of that kind, I think it sufficient to say, 1st, to Mr. *Clark*, That I heartily forgive all such Usage from whomsoever I receive it, and that I think my self in a particular manner oblig'd to forgive him: Because I sincerely believe he endeavour'd to be civil, and that he was as civil as he could be. And, 2^{dly}, as to my other Readers, I will take the liberty to believe them so much Philosophers, as that upon second Thoughts they will think *Civility* the best Answer and Reproof: Notwithstanding that we are lately told, by a Reverend * Au-
 thor, That *Good Nature and good Humour makes Men Atheists and Scepticks*.

*Edward's
 Preface to
 the Doctrine
 of Faith,
 &c. p. 19.

But there is one thing which I am very much surpriz'd to find in Mr. *Clark*, and of which I did not think him capable, and that is an insinuation that I *believe too little*.

3^d Def.
 p. 68.

For I did imagin that the || *usage* he had had || of the like kind, would have given him an opportunity to consider, that such Reflections are capable of being made by any body, and so derive no credit on their Author, and that they can please no Man of Candor and Ingenuity. However I shall not make that return which such an Insinuation does suggest and would justify, but
 instead

In the Remarks on his Sermons, and Defence of those Remarks.

(94)

instead thereof will give him on this occasion a Testimony in his favour, before I finally take my leave of him; That I verily think he neither *believes too little*, nor *too much*; but that he is perfectly and exactly Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue so.



E I N I S!